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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 OBJECT OF STUDY 
A growing number of public water operators have started to help other public water suppliers 
to improve their services in order to become more efficient and better trained. Such a support 
agreement is called Public-Public Partnership, short PUP. This is a “twinning arrangement 
with a stated non-profit motive that aims to improve water services in one or more of the 
partner regions and which includes only public partners.” 1 The water utilities or water 
companies work together on a non-profit basis to build up skills through the use of 
counselling, training, management, financial restructuring, joint investment, etc. Such a 
cooperation is often created because of twin town arrangements between cities or 
municipalities.2 PUPs work either at national or international level. A large number of PUPs 
already exists, more and more studies are carried out on that subject. Hall identified over 130 
water-PUPs in more than 70 countries. The existing PUPs have different characteristics but 
there are some general attributes every PUP possesses. 
In this paper PUPs are compared to Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). The latter are 
cooperations between public bodies and private companies to finance, build, renovate, 
operate and maintain the infrastructure or the provision of services. The idea is to combine 
the advantages of both sides. The public partner has controlling function and the possibility 
of co-determination. The private part can make profits because of economic and/or technical 
innovations. Then again the private company takes over several risks and is responsible for 
the organization of the service provision. Both try to achieve common complementary goals 
while the opportunities and risks are divided.3 The dynamics of PPPs are totally different 
from those of PUPs. The objectives and motivations, the basis of the partnership, the 
approach to accountability and transparency, the risk perception and its management and 
the proceedings concerning institutional differ sharply.4 
The UN advocates partnerships between public water operators. In 2006 the UN Secretary 
General's Board on Water and Sanitation (UNSGAB) has launched the initiative Water 
Operator Partnerships (WOPs). The idea behind this has been that the greatest potential to 
                                               
1Boag, McDonald 2010:4 
2Lobina, Hall 2006:7-8 
3Katzmayr 2005:119-120 
4Lobina, Hall 2006:26 
 5 
improve the public water utilities lies with the public suppliers themselves since most water 
utilities are organized locally or community-wide. Originally, the concept of WOPs has been 
the same as that of PUPs but meanwhile it was expanded and includes by now also private 
water suppliers.5 The differences between these two approaches and the risks posed by the 
expanded approach of WOPs are also described in chapter 4. 
This paper discusses the concept of PUPs, the different partnership types and partnership 
arrangements. Furthermore the characteristics of PUPs and the associated ideas which are 
given in the literature are provided and their accuracy for the cases of a Swedish and a 
Lithuanian operator are analysed. 
1.2 RESEARCH CONTEXT / PROBLEM PERSPECTIVE 
Water cannot be substituted and is more and more contaminated and sometimes even made 
unusable by the action of man. Furthermore, worldwide water consumption has risen 
continuously. Even the water reservoirs deep underground are devoted to cover the risen 
demand. In the agricultural sector huge amounts of water are wasted through irrigation. 
Companies have seen the opportunity to make high profits in the water sector, as the price 
for access to water was and is certainly due to increase tremendously. 
In July 2010 the UN declared water and sanitation as a universal human right. The resolution 
is calling on states and international organizations to provide financial resources, build 
capacity and transfer technology in scaling up efforts to provide safe, clean, accessible and 
affordable drinking water and sanitation for all. 6 Public-Public partnerships are a viable 
method to reach the aims that the UN sets. The Millennium Development Goals that the UN 
has set as major goals to reach worldwide until 2015 include a requirement that relates to 
drinking water and sanitation: "Halve, by 2015, the proportion of the population without 
sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation."7 This goal can only be 
reached through the public sector, because 90 per cent of the people are supplied by public 
authorities.8 Thus, PUPs can be development projects that improve access to drinking water 
and sanitation. PUPs are sustainable long term partnerships, which do not primarily rely on 
improving the infrastructure, but usually have the aim to train and develop human resources, 
to offer technical support or to improve efficiency and build institutional capacity. PUPs also 
                                               
5Lobina, Hall 2006:22 
6United Nations Department of Public Information, News and Media Division 2010 
7United Nations 2008:40 
8Miranda 2006:54 
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offer the option to bring already privatized utilities back into public hands. All these 
characteristics show that PUPs should be closely analysed and their benefits and potential 
challenges should be clarified. 
1.3 THE AIM OF THE PAPER 
I believe that it is most efficient when the water supply and waste water treatment remains in 
public hands. This thesis will demonstrate that water-PUPs have more advantages than 
public-private partnerships (PPPs) and privatization of public water services. It will be shown 
that PUPs are the appropriate means to achieve reforms for more efficiency, more 
transparency, cost effectiveness, increased accountability and improved training of workers 
in this sector. Until now the concept of Public-Public partnerships is little known. The Public 
Services International Research Unit (PSIRU) of the University of Greenwich, the 
Transnational Institute, the Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) are some of the few 
research institutions working on this issue. Additionally some regional studies were 
conducted. In the mainstream literature one will rarely find a paper dealing with such 
partnerships. Concerning public-private partnerships, there are already numerous works and 
articles. Hall and Lobina believe: "It is quite possible to create a new and viable public sector 
structure for water, even when it involves major changes from the preceding structures, 
without privatization. This seems very simple and obvious, but is constantly ignored in 
publications by major institutions, including the World Bank, World Water Council, Global 
Water Partnership, and others."9 For a long time the World Bank has promoted PPPs in the 
so-called developing countries. Now the bank has come to the conclusion that the latter do 
not invest enough and seen that private investors are apparently not ready to put money into 
the development of the infrastructure of countries in the South.10 
1.4 THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
There are several issues which will probably not be solved with the introduction of Public-
Public Partnerships. First and foremost the uneven power relations and differences in wealth 
within local communities and nation-states as well as globally between North and South. 
However, these conditions have to be kept in mind when PUPs are examined. 
                                               
9Hall, Lobina 2003:14 
10Hall 2009:6 
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When I analyse Public-Public partnerships in order to compare them to privatization and 
public-private partnerships, I will not dealt with the topic of price formation, but I will refer to 
the consequences of PUPs on the prices for consumer in the appropriate section of this 
paper. I also do not examine the market of bottled water, only the water provision via 
pipelines. 
This study has of course its limits and possible biases. First of all, it is only a study of 
literature. Only secondary literature is not sufficient to come to general results and 
conclusions. I have not looked inside a Public-Public Partnership myself. I could only rely on 
the studies already conducted. 
1.5 HYPOTHESES AND CASE STUDY 
Usually people refer to public institutions as inefficient, bureaucratic or slow. My basic 
assumption is rather that an ownership by the public sector is not in itself causing 
inefficiencies. There exists no inherent inability of public operations to be effective, efficient, 
equitable and environment-friendly. Katzmayr also points out that the trade-off between the 
discursive bargaining of the public and an efficient management of companies is firstly an 
ideological and secondly a economical question. It is possible to have an efficient and 
ecological public utility without the change of the ownership.11 
For the purpose of this paper I established two hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: In the water sector PUPs can outmatch PPPs or privatizations under certain 
circumstances. 
Hypothesis 2: PUPs primarily provide know-how transfer at low cost, thus outmatching 
comparable sources for the enhancement of efficiency, effectiveness and 
productivity. 
A representative case study of a successful PUP between a water operator in Sweden and a 
water operator in Lithuania is presented. It is analysed why and by whom this PUP was 
created and which political and social dynamics where behind its installation. The 
hypotheses are tested on this example. 
                                               
11Katzmayr 2005:144-145 
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The analysis of the literature and the case study will point out that PUPs are the better choice 
in regard to the water sector. Generally, the market mechanism is ill-equipped to reach the 
point where public goods, such as water, are provided in the right amounts.12 Thus it is 
inefficient that private companies provide public goods and hence, the provision of water 
services is done by the public sector with a good reason. PUPs provide a perspective on 
development for water operators in the North and South with regard to knowledge transfer, 
effective restructuring of public utilities, democratization of public utilities and solidarity 
building amongst public operators. 
1.6 EXPECTED SCIENTIFIC AND OTHER EFFECTS 
The work sheds light on a not well-researched area. The strengths and weaknesses of the 
PUP-approach as well as its prospects will be analysed. The idea of PUPs is driven forward 
and perhaps seen as a way to secure and reform the water supply of the public sector. 
1.7 LAYOUT OF THE THESIS 
Following a brief chapter on water at its current status including its qualities, possible use, 
forms of management and managing problems, this thesis reviews Public-Private-
Partnerships (PPPs) in the water sector and if the promises of this concept were kept. The 
third chapter deals with Public-Public-Partnerships (PUPs) which I propose to be an efficient 
way to handle water provision and sewage treatment problems. The following chapter 
describes Water Operator Partnerships (WOPs) and the problems of this concept, which is 
highly promoted by the UN. After this the findings and different concepts are discussed and 
the success factors, difficulties and challenges of the PUP concept are reviewed. 
  
                                               
12Mansfield, Yohe 2004.668 
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2. WATER: THE CURRENT STATUS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Before analysing partnerships of water suppliers and water supply in general, we should look 
at the resource water itself. There is absolutely no doubt that water is essential to sustain life. 
It is fundamental for any human activity and because of this reason it should be managed in 
a way that everyone has access to it. At the moment, this is far from being a reality. One out 
of eighth people still lacks access to drinking water and 2.6 billion people are affected by a 
lack of sanitation. In July 2010 the UN declared water and sanitation as a universal human 
right. The resolution is calling on states and international organisations to provide financial 
resources, to build capacity and to transfer technology in scaling up efforts to provide safe, 
clean, accessible and affordable drinking water and sanitation for all. 13 This illustrates the 
utmost urgency of water problems. 
On top of that, people have been very careless using water. Generally people thought water 
is always pure and clean and that it just purifies itself. In opposition to this popular belief 
water is only available when it regenerates itself and when the limits of its renewability are 
taken into account. This means that water is not easy to handle, especially because its 
supply is limited and it is not equally distributed all over the planet. There are water-rich and 
water-poor regions. Public-Public partnerships must be considered within this discussion in 
order to understand their potential of positive impact on the water crisis. 
The following questions will be answered in this section: How is the state of water today? 
How do we use it? What are the conflicts of use? How will water resources and water supply 
develop in the future? Does climate change affect water resources? And finally, how is water 
managed today and how can water act as support for development? 
2.2 WATER ON THE PLANET 
The amount of water which exists on our planet sums up to 1.386 million km³ and for the 
most part it is the water of the world's oceans, reflecting 96,5 %. Only 2,5 % of the total water 
is fresh water – i.e. water that contains only a very low amount of dissolved salts.14 For the 
human population the share of available water is even smaller. 69,5 % of fresh water is 
                                               
13United Nations General Assembly 2010:2-3 
14The Groundwater Foundation 2010 
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embedded in glaciers, snow, ice or permafrost. The remaining 30,5 % divide themselves into 
groundwater and water on the surface. Groundwater amounts up to 30,1 % and only 0,4 % of 
fresh water are on the surface as lakes, rivers, soil moisture, air humidity, marshes and 
wetlands as well as in living organisms.15 
 
Illustration 1: Water Cycle 
 
The total amount of water on the planet never changes, only its state and accessibility. Water 
switches through the natural hydrological cycle and changes between the states of liquid, 
vapour, and ice at various places within the cycle, displayed in illustration 1. This means 
water is in motion all the time. Because of solar energy, the surface water of reservoirs, soil 
and vegetation evaporates and enters into the atmosphere. The generated water vapour 
builds clouds and returns to the surface as rain or to reservoirs as run-off. The water 
                                               
15Shiklomanov, Rodda 2003:13 
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evaporated from the surface of oceans and seas either falls back into the sea or is 
transported by atmospheric circulation to the land where it falls down as rain or snow. 
Water is a renewable resource. Only when the recharge and inflow rates of basins and lakes 
are very slow, extractions can be seen as withdrawals of a non-renewable resource because 
it takes extremely long until this water has renewed itself. Also contaminations can transform 
water into a non-renewable resource. Modifications of water sheds, e.g. cutting forests, can 
reduce the recharge of water in the same way.16 Thus, even though more than 70 % of our 
planet is covered with water17, small changes inside the ecosystem can have huge impacts 
on it. 
The human influence on the hydrological cycle has been immense and is still growing year 
per year. Due to the increasing population, the development of the industrial production, and 
the increased agricultural production, more and more water is demanded. The water used for 
agriculture is devoted to irrigation which causes more evaporation and thus an intensification 
of the hydrological cycle. The use of groundwater as drinking water constitutes another 
interference. This leads to a reduction of aquifer storage, the decline of the groundwater 
levels and sometimes even the surface shifts downwards (land subsidence). Furthermore, 
rivers are being slowed down because of the construction of reservoirs influencing the water 
quality.18 So we see that human-done modifications have already changed the flow of the 
water cycle. Withdrawals and usage of water for economic reasons are interventions into the 
aquatic ecosystem. They can have various impacts on the ecosystem and affect either the 
quality or the quantity of water or even both. These effects are greater the more a society 
consumes water.19 
If a population is growing, so does the consumption of water 20  - therefore the water 
availability will decrease more and more. We can find the highest water availability in 
Canada, Alaska and Oceania. People living in these areas have the possibility to consume 
170.000 to 180.000 m³ per head every year. By contrast in North Africa and the Arabian 
Peninsula the water availability is only 200-300 m³ per year per head. This is categorized as 
catastrophically low water availability and is causing serious problems to households and 
                                               
16Gleick, Wolff, Chalecki, Reyes, Rachel 2002:5 
17Pidwirny, M. 2006 
18Shiklomanov, Rodda 2003:17 
19Katzmayr 2005:89-90 
20Water consumption is that part of withdrawn water which is evaporated, transpired, incorporated into 
products or crops, consumed by humans or livestock, or otherwise removed from the immediate 
water environment. [World Water Assessment Programme 2009:98] 
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agriculture. It is estimated that by 2025 the majority of the world's population will have to live 
with very low or catastrophically low water availability, which is less than 1000 m³ per year, 
per head. Developing countries will be hit by severe water stress caused by their growing 
population and increasing water consumption.21 The purposes for which we need the scarce 
water resources are discussed in the following section. 
 
Illustration 2: Evolution of Freshwater Use 
2.3 WATER USAGE 
We need water for drinking, sanitation, cooking, bathing, washing up, doing the laundry, the 
toilet and for watering livestock and vegetable plots. We need this special resource to 
produce our food (e.g. meat, fish, vegetables, fruits etc.), to produce energy, and within the 
industrial production process (e.g. for cooling and cleaning). We use the waterways for 
transportation and water is needed in the tourist and leisure industry. Water itself is also used 
as a commodity and sold as bottled water or for domestic use. 
Beside this basic information, the knowledge about water use is still very limited. Most of the 
compiled data and statistics are based on estimations. Generally one can say that water 
resources and the population are not evenly distributed around the world and that they are 
                                               
21Shiklomanov, Rodda 2003:384-385 
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used for different purposes.22 One of the calculations of the world water use for the year 
1995 show that the water withdrawals amounted for 3.752 km³. This is more than the volume 
of Lake Huron in Northern America23. Shiklomanov estimates that withdrawals will increase 
by 37 % to 5.139 km³ in 2025. 
Not only is the amount of used water changing but also the patterns of use. Today, 66,5 % of 
the abstractions are used for agriculture, 19 % for industry, 9,5 % by households and 5 % are 
withdrawn by reservoirs. It is foreseen for 2025 that the stake of agriculture will not grow at 
the same degree as before but the water usage for the industry and households will 
increase. The industry will abstract 21,5 %, households will consume 12,6 % and reservoirs 
will need slightly more than before (5,2 %). Agriculture will still take up 60,7 % of the world's 
water use. 24 The evolution of the global water use can be seen in illustration 2. 
Irrigation in agriculture takes up 70% of water withdrawals and this amount can rise up to 
more than 80% in some regions. 25  To achieve high and stable crop yields that are 
independent of the meteorological conditions, irrigation is seen as the most important agro-
technical method.26 It can increase yields of most crops by 100 to 400 %. Generally there are 
three different techniques to irrigate crops. The most common technique is surface irrigation 
in which most or all of the crop area is flooded. A second possibility is sprinkler irrigation 
which simulates rainfall by pumping water under pressure through a pipe network before 
delivering it through a sprinkler system. The most water-efficient method is localized 
irrigation, in which water is distributed under low pressure through pipes and applied in small 
quantities to each plant or the area close-by.27 At the moment localized irrigation is still 
expensive but in the near future it will become more widely used to save water and to 
increase crop yields. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 
estimates that irrigated land in developing countries will increase up to 34 % by 2030, due to 
improved irrigation practices the amount of water used by agriculture will increase only by 
14%.28 
Industrial water use has highly increased during the past decades. The main reason is the 
rising demand for electric power. In this section huge amount of water is required for cooling 
                                               
22World Water Assessment Programme 2009:97 
23U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2010 
24Shiklomanov, Rodda 2003:374-377 
25World Water Assessment Programme 2009:99 
26Shiklomanov, Rodda 2003:33-35 
27FAO 2008:7 
28FAO 2008:14 
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and smaller amounts for the boilers. Furthermore, the production of synthetic fibres, artificial 
rubber and plastics has also grown. Both consume a lot of water. The industry uses it to cool 
the equipment, instruments and mechanisms; for transportation and washing; as a solvent or 
as part of the finished product. Evidently, water is used for sanitation and for meeting the 
demands of the workforce in industrial enterprises. However, the vast bulk is used for the 
generation of electricity in thermal or nuclear power stations. Following the sector of power 
production, the chemical and petrochemical industries, ferrous and non-ferrous metal, wood 
pulp and paper industry and machine-building enterprises are taking the remaining share of 
industrial water.29 
Because of urbanization and an increasing standard of living, more and more water is 
consumed in most countries to meet municipal needs. Municipal water is used for domestic 
purposes of cities and towns as well as of public and private enterprises. The volume of 
municipal water use depends on the number of people served. This involves to what degree 
these people are equipped with services and utilities. Further the volume of consumed 
municipal water is related to climatic conditions. It is considered that 150 to 250 litres of 
water per day and per person are sufficient to meet all personal demands. For the operation 
of municipal enterprises and maintenance of cleanliness and hygiene in cities, 150 to 200 
litres per day and per head are required additionally. When the water demand lies above 
these values, this is mostly caused by the demand of industry and for garden-watering. 
When small towns and villages do not have an effective distribution system, water use lies 
between 75 and 100 litres per day and per person.30 
Systematically different “users” of fresh water like reservoirs need to be mentioned. Building 
such reservoirs enables a population to artificially increase water resources during low flow 
periods and in dry seasons. They are also able to provide water for industrial or agricultural 
use. Furthermore, they can protect areas from flooding and are tools to regulate the amount 
of water. Nevertheless, they decrease, caused by evaporation, the total water resource in the 
region in which they are built substantially. It is estimated that the reservoirs volume of the 
world will increase up to 6.800-7.000 km³. This development is caused by the more important 
role of hydro-power and its function as supply for peak load demands.31 
  
                                               
29Shiklomanov, Rodda 2003:31-32 
30Shiklomanov, Rodda 2003:30 
31Shiklomanov, Rodda 2003:36 
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2.3.1 CONFLICTS OF WATER USE 
Conflicts of water use can occur at different levels and at all scales. There are local-level 
conflicts when, for example, farmers compete for limited water resources. Disputes can also 
occur at the scale of large national or transnational river basins. Different sectors (e.g. 
domestic, hydro-power, irrigation, industries and recreation) are competing for the limited 
resource of water. Also the ecosystem itself, whose sustainability is at risk, needs a sufficient 
amount of the resource.32 
A common conflict arises between agriculture and cities. Today, half of the world's population 
lives in cities and agriculture is the sector that uses most water worldwide. It is often argued 
that agriculture should give up a part of its share of water to solve problems of poor urban 
water supply. Generally, conflicts between these two arise when there are shortages. Even 
though a lot of cities have problems to find water of adequate quality in their surroundings, 
cities with poor water and sanitation supply are still growing at the highest rates. Thus, poor 
water and sanitation do not hinder a urban population to grow. These cities seem to be 
successful in increasing their supplies by constructing new reservoirs on nearby streams, 
inter-basin transfers, tapping local or distant aquifers by means of deep wells or diverting 
water away from other uses. These procedures generate third-party impacts. The 
reallocation away from agriculture to other sectors leads to the fact that adjustments are 
made to improve irrigation efficiency and that the crop patterns are changed.33 
However, farmers are also pushed to exploit groundwater or to divert more surface water 
which harms the environment. It is probable that they use treated or even untreated 
wastewater. It can actually get that far that farmers are driven out of business because of 
reduced water supply. It is likely that in the future cities will try to redirect neighbouring water 
to their own use.34 The negative consequences are to a large extent borne by the poor and 
the environment.35 Molle and Berkoff are putting it that way: “[T]he conflict between human 
use in general, and the environment in particular, is perhaps more critical than that between 
agriculture and cities.”36  They say that it is misleading to associate the insufficient and 
precarious supply of water in cities with water scarcity caused by wasteful irrigation in 
agriculture. A reallocation from agriculture to another sector does not occur in practice and 
                                               
32World Water Assessment Programme 2009:152 
33Molle, Berkoff 2006: 24-28 
34Molle, Berkoff 2006: 32-34 
35World Water Assessment Programme 2009:153 
36Molle, Berkoff 2006: 35 
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we need to understand the economic and political aspects of water supply and water 
scarcity. The problem, mainly in developing countries, lies in the lack of farmers' capital 
which depends on the local political economy and the distribution of power in society.37 
Another conflict line emerges between the hydro-power sector and the sector of agriculture 
including fisheries. Dams may release water to produce energy at times when downstream 
irrigators do not need it because hydro-power plants follow energy consumer demands. The 
fish migration can also be obstructed by dams and hydro-power plants reducing the 
productivity of fisheries and changing the water regime.38 However, the industries seem not 
to be hindered by water supply constraints. Usually they receive priority because of their 
economic importance. Furthermore, the industrial sector relies heavily on groundwater and is 
somehow de-linked from problems like droughts. Hence the groundwater sources can 
deplete and this will generate a backlash in the future.39 
All these conflicts originate from economic and political reasons. The return per cubic meter 
of water differs across its usage as well as the social importance and the political influence of 
each sector varies.40  In general, states give priority to cities and industries due to the 
economic logic and elite interests.41 
It is frequently proposed by different authors and organisations to move water from 
agriculture to areas of higher economic value. The possibility to maximize the net benefit 
from the used water is generally higher in non-agricultural sectors42. But critics say that there 
are several severe problems regarding this recommendation, for example that farmers are 
losing out when competing with the industry. Furthermore, the preservation of landscapes 
and wetlands is of high value for our future generations apart from economic uses or 
recreational purposes. With the only aim to maximize profits this aspect is ignored. All in all 
there is the possibility that you see nature as a huge lay-down for human requirements or 
one has the view that nature has a value on its own.43 
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2.4 QUALITY OF WATER 
Human-generated water pollution poses a great threat to the water quality. Worldwide water 
pollution is rising due to economic development driven by urbanization, industries and 
intensive agricultural systems. Heavy polluting industries are for example the leather and 
chemicals industry. The polluted water has enormous negative effects on human health. One 
tenth of the global burden of diseases derives from water, sanitation and hygiene, plus water 
and environmental factors. The major water pollutants are microbes, nutrients, heavy metals, 
organic chemicals, oil and sediments, and heat. Eutrophication is the world's most common 
water quality problem which is the increase of the concentration of nutrients like phosphorus 
and nitrogen in the water. This impairs the beneficial use of water and is caused by 
agricultural run-off, domestic sewage, industrial effluents and atmospheric inputs from fossil 
fuel burning and bush fire. A nutrient imbalance can also cause harmful algal blooms. The 
fact that data from many countries on pollution loads and on changes in water quality is still 
missing is complicating the situation. Mainly this results from inadequate monitoring 
systems. 44  Hence, it is hard to give a global overview over polluted waters. Moreover 
informal settlements that are not officially approved by the government are generally missing 
in statistics.45 A study from the French Ministry of Health estimates that more than 3 million 
people in France were exposed to water with a quality that does not reach the standards of 
the World Health Organisation (WHO).46 Both, UNICEF and the WHO propose that new 
targets set beyond 2015 should address water quality and the need to be measure and 
estimate it in a meaningful and cost-effective way. 47 
In general, drinking-water standards vary among countries and regions. The WHO issues 
international norms on water quality and human health that are used as a basis for regulation 
and standard setting. The organisation has published Guidelines for Drinking-water Quality 
which should support the development and implementation of risk management strategies to 
ensure the safety of drinking-water supplies through the control of hazardous constituents of 
water. The intention of this thesis is to lead to national standards and regulations that can be 
readily implemented and enforced and that are protective of public health. 48 
  
                                               
44World Water Assessment Programme 2009:136-140 
45World Water Assessment Programme 2009:103-104 
46World Water Assessment Programme 2009:139 
47World Health Organization, UNICEF 2010:35 
48World Health Organisation 2008:1-2 
 18 
2.4.1 SEWAGE TREATMENT 
To achieve high water quality standards, it is necessary, among other arrangements, to 
purify the sewage. Sewage treatment means that physical, chemical and biological 
contaminants are removed from waste-water. This produces a treated waste-stream as well 
as solid waste or sludge that is discharged or reused for agricultural irrigation, urban 
landscaping and recreational uses, industrial cooling and processing and indirect potable 
water production. There are different methods of sewage treatment applied: water-borne 
sanitation systems and pollution mitigation systems. Another possibility is demonstrated in 
the usage of lagoons for collective units or of eco-sanitation units for rural households when 
water is scarce. 
In developing countries, however, more than 80 % of sewage is discharged without treatment 
which pollutes rivers, lakes and coastal areas. But even in industrialized countries the 
sewage is not treated sufficiently. In most low- and middle-income countries waste-water is 
led untreated into the sea or rivers. 49 
2.5 CLIMATE CHANGE 
Aside from the growing population, changes of land-use and of the global economy, the 
water availability will be lowered additionally because of climate change. The losses of 
mountain snow packs, glaciers and ice caps will speed up during the 21st century which first 
produces an oversupply and afterwards shortage of water availability and hydro-power 
potential. Furthermore, it changes the periodic variations of melt-water flows in regions 
supplied from major mountain ranges. One sixth of the human population is living in these 
regions.50 
The run-off will increase at higher latitudes and in some wet tropical areas because of 
changed precipitation and temperatures. The run-off is expected to decrease because in dry 
regions at mid-latitudes and dry due to less rainfall and higher levels of evapo-transpiration. 
Drought-affected areas will most likely increase in size and number. This will lead to an 
increased water demand for irrigation in divers regions too.51 
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Different risks will become more serious as a general result of the climate change. Floods as 
an example will increase due to an increase of heavy rainfall in many regions. Limited water 
availability poses a threat to society, physical infrastructure and to the quality of water itself. 
Higher temperatures influence the physical, chemical and biological properties of lakes and 
rivers which will have adverse effects on many freshwater species, community compositions 
and the quality of the water bodies. As the sea level rises, the groundwater supplies are 
getting more and more salinized resulting in a decrease of the amount of freshwater.52 The 
poorer regions of the world will severely be hit by the effects of climate change. In Africa, an 
estimated 75 to 250 million people are facing increased water stress by 2020. In some 
African countries the yields from rain-fed agriculture could scale back by 50 %. The 
freshwater resources of small islands in the Caribbean and the Pacific are likely to become 
insufficient to meet the demand of their people during low-rainfall periods by the middle of the 
century.53 
As a consequence of different time horizons climate change is important considering private 
or public water supply. A region could, for example, develop into an arid zone. Such a 
transformation heavily influences the management of the water provision. Precautionary 
measures need to be taken in order to avoid shortages. 
2.6 WATER MANAGEMENT 
In this section I would like to give an overview over how water supply and sanitation is 
organized, Furthermore, I will point out the differences between rural and urban supply plus 
answer the question of how water services are financed on the supply and the demand side. 
How does water come to us? All over the world water supply and sanitation are usually 
organised by the public sector. Today most urban and peri-urban regions are served by 
publicly owned and managed utilities. 54  However, the number of people served by the 
private water sector has grown from around 50 million in 1990 to about 300 million by the 
year 2002. Nevertheless, most people in developing countries are not served by either 
private or partially private companies anyhow.55 
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2.6.1 PRIVATE WATER COMPANIES 
Aside of the question whether private provision is beneficial to consumers (respectively 
citizens), this section gives information on private water companies. 
In the private water sector two French multinationals dominate the global market: Veolia and 
Suez. Both control over two-thirds of global private water operations and both also use 
subsidiaries to run their businesses. For example Veolia works via USFilter and Suez via 
United Water in the US. Meanwhile, several major multinationals have withdrawn from 
international projects and have been entirely or mostly sold by their parent companies. The 
German group RWE sold the British daughter Thames Water in 2006. The French 
construction company Bouygues disposed most of the international operations of SAUR 
which is the third-largest French water company. The US company Bechtel and the Italian 
firm Montedison sold their holdings in International Water and the Anglian Water Group also 
disposed its international operations. A smaller water operator from the UK, Biwater, is still 
internationally active. 56 
The strategy of the multinationals targeted on becoming multi-utility-corporations. These 
corporations provide energy, public transport, waste management, and all other forms of 
public services. The water market was interesting for these global players because going into 
this sector provided a possibility to bind customers in other already liberalized sectors such 
as energy or gas. It seems as if this strategy has not worked out.57 
Several public sector companies have also started operating outside of their home country. 
In Ghana a consortium of three public operators (Vitens from the Netherlands, Rand Water 
from South Africa and the National State Water Corporation of Uganda) has been awarded a 
contract to support the urban water utility Ghana Water Company Ltd. The Austrian EVN has 
started to expand into Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.58 
The importance of private, small-scale and local water providers is generally increasing. It is 
estimated that these providers serve 25% of the urban population in Latin America and East 
Asia and 50% in Africa and South East Asia.59 
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2.6.2 FINANCING WATER SERVICES 
Practically, all activities relating to water need financial resources to be developed, to be 
implemented and carried out. These activities include water resources management and 
development; water services to municipalities and households, commerce and industry, 
agriculture, and other economic sectors as well as water sector policy development, 
research, monitoring, administration, legislation and public information. Governments have 
three options to finance water-related activities: tariffs, taxes as well as transfers through 
external aid and philanthropy. Fees have to be paid by local users and they are levied mostly 
by local authorities. Finance by taxes means that the national government is responsible for 
the collection and distribution of the funds. It is also possible to gain funding by the 
international community. This is done mainly for jump-start projects.60 
Prices played a relatively minor role in managing water demand. When assessing the 
affordability of water charges for households, the yardstick commonly used is that payments 
should not exceed 3 % of net household income. A problem is that poorer groups generally 
spend a higher share of their household income on water.61 Generally, only little data is 
available on the amount on investments spent directly by households (e.g. on-site sanitation 
or self-supply of water).62 
2.6.3 PROBLEMS OF WATER MANAGEMENT 
When problems regarding the water sector occur, which is mostly the case in developing 
countries and countries in transition, then the following ones are most common and 
widespread: lack of political support, poor governance, under-resourcing and under-
investment. Thus, this sector is generally not transparent, not accountable, and not 
economically sustainable and shows high levels of unaccounted-for water and low revenue 
collection. This often results in a deterioration of infrastructure, the eventual breakdown of 
services and which itself leads to customer dissatisfaction. Another issue is the fact that 
operations and maintenance are neglected almost in all countries for the benefit of 
investments in new infrastructure. The UN proposes contrariwise to target a balance 
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between hard and soft infrastructure which includes the support for policies, legal systems 
and human capacity building. 63 
Nearly all over the world there are problems with water losses. According to the International 
Water Association (IWA) these real losses - when water is produced but does not reach the 
consumer - derive from leaks, bursts and overflows on mains, service reservoirs and service 
connections, up to the point of customer metering. 64 In urban distribution systems leakage 
rates of 50% are not uncommon.65 Losses of municipal water are caused by evaporation, 
leaks in the water supply and sewerage systems as well as by watering gardens and lawns, 
cleaning streets, for recreation areas and allotments. When there are public, well-managed 
and relatively new systems for water supply and sewage disposal, the losses usually are 
between 5 % and 10 % of the total intake water. The losses can reach up from 40 % to 60 % 
if there are no such systems or the towns are not fully equipped with them.66 
We can observe that there are already changes going on concerning the water management 
practices. The concepts of water planning and management concentrated for a 100 years on 
geographically large, physical infrastructure-based water supply and sanitation systems that 
provide a single quality product. Because of climatic, environmental, social and economic 
pressures this paradigm has changed. The new concepts focus on multi-source, multi-
quality, and multi-use loops of water provision.67 Furthermore, people and companies try to 
economise their water use and tempt to reduce abstractions. Since the 1990s major water 
service reforms have taken place in many countries. Most of the time it was a move from 
centralized to decentralized public provision. A lot of national monopolies were broken down 
into hundreds of municipal providers. The transition for most water consumers has not been 
from public to private but from an unregulated centralized public provider to a regulated 
decentralized public provider. 68  Though, when there are troubles, then die IFIs usually 
propose a private provision. 
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The problems of water management today can generally be summed up by the following 
keywords: low efficiency, environmental degradation and inequality. Some improvements 
have been achieved but the water use efficiency is still low in many sectors.69 
2.7 WATER SUPPORTING DEVELOPMENT 
There are only four years to go until the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) target date, 
when the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking-water and basic 
sanitation should be halved, is reached. Access to drinking water is defined as the availability 
of at least 20 litres of drinking water per person per day within one km of the dwelling or as a 
30 minutes water-hauling trip from there, respectively. The drinking water should be safe and 
thus meet accepted quality standards and pose no significant health risk. Access to basic 
sanitation represents access to an improved sanitation facility for defecation, which means 
that human excreta are hygienically separated from human contact or the immediate 
environment.70 
It is foreseen that all regions worldwide will meet the MDG drinking water target. In the year 
2006 54% of the world population already had a piped connection to a dwelling, plot or yard. 
33% used different improved drinking water sources. The rest of the population, which 
accounts for 884 million people, does not have any of those connections and almost all of 
them live in developing regions. Still, even when people have access to improved water 
services, there can be the problem that these services are poorly maintained, inoperable for 
many hours a day or provide polluted water. Another point to mention is that the water supply 
and sanitation coverage is generally much higher in urban than in rural areas. Altogether we 
can see a progress in water supply nearly everywhere (except in Sub-Saharan Africa) but the 
sanitation coverage ranks far behind. In Sub-Saharan Africa and Oceania 2,4 billion people 
are likely to be without access to basic sanitation. 71 So this MDG target will very probably 
not be met. 
The different actors of water supply are public utilities, private organisations, communities or 
individuals. As the majority of the world population is served by public operators it could be a 
reasonable way to support the public sector in order to increase the number of people having 
access to safe drinking-water and to basic sanitation. One way of doing this is the 
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establishment of Public-Public Partnerships. Despite such actions, governments, 
international organisations and IFIs focused for the last years on the private sector. These 
developments will be discussed in the following chapter. 
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3. PRIVATISATION AND PPPS 
As water is such a special resource it evokes emotions like no other issue. As chapter one 
has shown, the benefits of water for humans, animals and the ecosystem as a whole are 
countless. Regrettably, in huge parts of the world, problems with the provision of water exist. 
When reforms of public utilities are discussed to overcome these problems, the focus usually 
lies on Private Sector Participation (PSP) 72  or Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). 
International Financial Institutions, bilateral donors and transnational corporations favoured 
the participation of the private sector for decades, especially in the water sector. The 
outcome of this process is mixed. In this chapter arguments are presented that illustrate that 
PSP and PPPs in the water sector are not as successful as presumed. Furthermore, the 
chapter discusses the theoretical ideas behind privatisation, followed by the objectives and 
incentives to fully or partly privatise a public service. This part is followed by exemplifying 
practical experiences with privatisation such as the very common Public-Private Partnerships 
or corporatisation. In the end of this chapter I will sum up the outcomes of the privatisation 
process. 
3.1 PRIVATISATION IN THEORY 
Privatisation stands for “the transfer of ownership and control of government or state assets, 
firms and operations to private investors.” Publicly owned utilities or assets are fully or partly 
sold to private companies. A private company, of course, is privately owned, managed and 
financed. The private sector respectively private entities are characterised by a commercial 
objective to make profits. In a broader sense privatisation also includes policies like 
contracting-out which is “the process by which activities, while publicly organized and 
financed, are carried out by private sector companies.” 73  This process is called 
corporatisation at this point and will be explained later on in this chapter. 
The basic goal of privatisation and market liberalisation is to create a market economy in 
which goods and services cost their “real” prices. This fact leads to the efficient allocation of 
resources which, in turn, leads to economic growth for the benefit of all. The private 
ownership of companies that provide goods and services is theoretically leading to the “real” 
                                               
72
 PSP includes a wide range of arrangements between a government agency and a non-public 
institution. Informal operators or civil society organisation are also part of PSP. (Budds, 
McGranahan 2003:87) 
73
 OECD Glossary 
 26 
prices because the market logic provides the adequate incentives through motives like profit-
seeking and increased competition.74  
Katzmayr75 describes the ideal procedure of a privatisation process as follows:  
1. The profit of selling is yielded from the public company to the tax-payers.  
2. The municipality does not have to spend money on future investments and just needs 
to invest into regulation measures and thus saves money and time.  
3. A customer-friendly service is provided by the private company. 
4. The politicians have more time for their strategic tasks and thus they offer a better 
service to the citizens. 
 
Altogether this process should enable a higher efficiency, an improved financial position of 
the public sector, free resources for an allocation in other important sectors like social policy, 
and strengthens the role of the private sector altogether.76 It is a move away from 'the 
taxpayer pays' towards 'the user pays' and it is intended to achieve a better economic use of 
the privatised services.77  Additionally, it is presumed that corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) acts as a form of self-regulation.78 The company formed after a privatisation should be 
characterised by a facilitated business management according to economic principles, a 
more flexible personnel policy, less complex budgetary and fiscal regulations and a tailor-
made organization.79  
Several economic concepts come into play in the case of water. Most of them are exceptions 
from the general rules or assumptions because the water sector is very special. An 
illustrating example is that a high capital intensity leads to high sunk costs. These are costs 
which, once payable, cannot be recovered. When sunk costs are present, firms face a barrier 
to exit and to enter a market.80 Moreover, a high percentage of the costs of water systems 
arise from investments in the network. Extending and maintaining the network is expensive. 
Furthermore, long-term storage in times of droughts is problematic. Above all, there is no 
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substitute for water and it is directly linked to public health and environmental issues. Thus, 
the water industry does not fit into standard economic theory. 81 
Privatisation in theory is great and brings a lot of benefits to the government and to the 
society as a whole. What should not be forgotten is the fact that the theory of privatisation is 
based on the assumption that there are no externalities and no public goods, that the market 
is not monopolistic and that there is no asymmetry of information. These are all assumptions 
that rarely bear accord with reality. For the case of water supply, which is seen as natural 
monopoly, privatisation becomes much more complex. 
3.2 DIGRESSION: ECONOMIC CONCEPTS 
The neoclassical theory knows different cases, where markets fall short of efficient and 
perfect competition. The four most important cases of market failure are public goods; 
externalities, like pollution; imperfect competition, such as monopolies, and inadequate 
property rights. Another concept that can be attributed to water services is the one of the 
natural monopoly. 
3.2.1 PUBLIC GOODS 
In the neoclassical theory a pure public good possesses two characteristics: it is non-rival 
and non-exclusive. First, this good can be enjoyed by a person without reducing the 
enjoyment that it gives to others. Second, people cannot easily or costless be excluded from 
consuming this good.82 When a good fulfils only one of these characteristics it is an impure 
public good. 
Private and public goods can be differentiated by looking at the question of exclusion and 
impact. The decision to consume a private good like bread is an individual decision and does 
not commit anyone else to consume a certain amount of bread and has no external benefits 
or costs to other individuals. On the other hand, the decision to provide a certain level of a 
public good like primary health care or public schools has a great impact on the people in a 
certain region or a country. These levels are crucial for the well-being of the population and 
their benefits are spread among the entire community. There are also global public goods 
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which are externalities whose impacts are indivisibly spread across the planet such as global 
warming.83 
In the case of water it is possible to exclude users and it is possible that there are rivalries 
because drinking water is a scarce resource in some regions of the world. Thus, water is 
usually seen as an impure public good because it is a common pool resource which is non-
excludable but rival in consumption. However, the non-excludability is more and more 
contested through privatization or bypassed, for example, by sold bottled water. Therefore, 
water takes on more aspects of a private good. Nevertheless, basic ecological functions or 
services are provided by water resources. This underpins the argument of water as a public 
good. 84 
3.2.2 EXTERNALITIES 
The second type of market failure is produced by externalities. A positive externality is the 
case when the action of one economic actor results in uncompensated benefit to others. A 
negative externality describes the opposite case: the actions of one economic actor cause 
uncompensated harm for others. These actions take place outside the marketplace. They are 
seen as “failures” because there are economic transactions without payment. 85 
In Chapter one we have seen that the water taken up by cities has an impact on the water 
supply for agriculture. Here, negative externalities include effects on the performance of a 
river and on the groundwater system. A positive externality can occur when the quality of the 
water is ameliorated and thus the state of health of a community is improved. 
3.2.3 IMPERFECT COMPETITION 
Under imperfect competition a buyer or a seller is able to affect a good's price in a way which 
is never the case under perfect competition. Examples are monopolies which have the power 
to reduce the quantity of sales or increase the price of goods and services at the same time. 
Monopolies exist when there is only one supplier on the market resulting in an elimination of 
any competition which causes market failure. Such a market failure leads to an obstruction of 
the so-called free market forces. Thus, there is no positive impact on the general public. This 
is the reason why the neoclassic urges for the control of monopolies by the state. In reality, 
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nearly all industries possess characteristics of imperfect competition.86 The market for water 
services is one of them. The global water industry is dominated by only a few transnational 
companies, as described in chapter one.87 
3.2.4 NATURAL MONOPOLY 
In the neoclassical theory natural monopolies are markets in which a good or a service can 
be efficiently produced only by a single firm. Natural monopolies have nothing to do with 
nature. The natural stands for inevitable or mandatory. A natural monopoly exists because of 
increasing economies of scale. The costs per unit decrease with increasing production 
because the fixed costs do not increase to the same extent as the unit costs. For example 
the costs per cubic meter of water decrease when the amount of produced/treated water 
increases because the fixed costs of labour and infrastructure are divided over a larger 
amount of water. Many natural monopolies are network-bound industries such as electricity, 
gas or water.88 
3.2.5 PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Theorists in property rights believe that the overexploitation of the environment and thus the 
production of public goods should be regulated by market economy, which requires an 
allocation of property rights.89 A property right consists of “the right to consume, earn income 
from or sell the asset. The process of establishing property rights involves enshrining legal 
ownership.” Such a property right allows the owner to possess an asset. Necessarily, this 
includes the opportunity for the owner to take legal steps, provided by the law, in case of a 
violation of his/her rights. Regarding water, usually the state and public officials decide who 
receives water rights, how the water should be used, and how much will be charged for its 
use.90 The theory of property rights assumes in contrast that public companies have a low 
efficiency due to less strong property rights.91 It is presumed that only the market forces urge 
for an unambiguous assignment of property rights for reasons of transaction cost savings. 
The inadequate specification of property rights, as is present in an extreme case with 
common goods and public goods, is regarded as one of the main causes of market failure.92 
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In a World Bank paper it is also stated, “Once rights are defined and can be traded and 
transactions costs are low, assets will be employed in the most efficient manner. In this way 
societal welfare will be maximized.” The authors propose that water rights should “be sold at 
freely negotiated prices to anyone for any purpose.”93  
I assume, contrary to that, that there is no difference concerning property rights of water 
between public or private suppliers. It is questionable whether the transaction costs are really 
lower for private companies because they also have to secure their rights for sources and 
pipelines. The city of Vienna is an example for a municipality that owns water sources and 
has now problem to secure them. The city owns headwaters in Lower Austria and in Styria 
and two Mountain Spring Pipelines (in German Hochquellenleitungen) which provide the city 
with water from those areas.94 
3.3 OBJECTIVES AND INCENTIVES TO (FULLY OR PARTLY) 
PRIVATISE 
To understand the reasons for privatisations and PPPs, it is important to know the objectives 
and incentives of governments, international organisations, international financial institutions 
(IFIs), municipalities and private companies. In this section I will also give a brief overview 
over historical processes concerning the changing discourse in development cooperation. 
3.3.1 GOVERNMENTS IN GENERAL AND MUNICIPALITIES 
Governments face the pressure to reduce their national debts. At the same time they need to 
expand and improve public facilities. Governments often claim that they face constraints of 
borrowing and at the same time a reluctance to increase taxes or charges. Thus they have 
invited private sector entities to enter into contracts in order to construct or manage public 
sector infrastructure facilities, or to provide services to the community on behalf of the public 
body.95 Their aim is an effective use of public funds. The public operator needs to ensure 
that the disposable funds are spent in an economical, efficient and effective way. This should 
derive from private sector innovation, different asset design or construction techniques and 
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operational practices. Key risks are transferred to the private sector which has to manage 
them appropriately.96 
The municipalities are nowadays embedded and integrated in a world market. The global 
economic integration leads to a reduction of the economic, social and political relevance of 
local communities. The financial strength of the municipalities diminishes. Given that more 
and more public operations are privatised. The communities lose their abilities to provide 
them and they also loose a relevant source of income. Profits are taken out of the local 
system but the costs are at the expenses of the citizens. This is clearly a reason for the 
occurrence of curious financing forms like Cross-Border-Leasing which has been prohibited 
by the law of the United States in the meantime.97 Altogether, the public sector at the local 
and municipal level mostly lacks assets and creditworthiness resulting in difficulties to gain 
access to commercial finance.98 
3.3.2 GOVERNMENTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
In the 1960's and 1970's the development goal was to provide a cost-free access to water for 
everybody. The idea was that the governments of the developing countries had to render the 
water services and that IFIs had to support them. In the 1980's the discourse changed and 
the aim was that social infrastructure should be financed by cost-sharing. In the 1990's the 
private sector discovered water as a profitable business. Multinational companies were 
attracted by a large new market. At the same time the principle of full-cost-coverage came up 
in the development discourse.99 Budds, McGranahan conclude about developments, “The 
neoliberal agenda was [...] adopted by the North-dominated international financial institutions 
(primarily the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund) which, using their 
leverage as creditors, aggressively promoted neoliberal reforms to governments of indebted 
low- and middle-income countries, often through structural adjustment policies that 
advocated the reduction of state spending and avoidance of substantial state investment.”100 
It seemed that the governments of developing countries had failed to provide access to 
public services for everyone and thus it was worth turning to the private sector to solve this 
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problem.101 Consequently, the development countries have the “incentive” to follow the 
conditions of their financial donors. The countries in the South are still highly dependent to 
the North and to IFIs which can, more or less, dictate them economic policies. The conditions 
to multilateral and bilateral development finance imposed by donor agencies and donor 
countries are perceived by many critics as a means of pursuing the interests of the donor 
country's private sector rather than the interests of the recipient countries.102 The power 
imbalance between indebted countries and the IFIs or multinational corporations during 
negotiations cannot be dismissed. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) for example gives 
loans to countries which are forced to agree to implement economic and financial policies 
which often include reductions in public spending, in private consumption or of imports. 
These policies are usually concurring with resistance by the affected countries and their 
population.103 By the way, note that the IMF has not only given loans to countries in the 
South, but also to several Eastern European countries such as Hungary, Romania or 
Ukraine.104  
3.3.3 INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND  
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
The main aim of international organisations like the UN and IFIs is to ensure access to safe 
drinking water and access to basic sanitation for as many people as possible. The MDGs, 
which all UN member states and 23 international organisations105 (including the World Bank 
and the IMF) have agreed on in 2000, reflect this wish clearly. 
At the Third World Water Forum in 2003 the Camdessus report on financing water services 
was presented. The Global Water Partnership (GWP), the World Water Council (WWC) and 
the 3rd World Water Forum had set up a panel comprising 20 financial experts that 
addressed the attraction of financial resources to the water sector. The conclusion drawn by 
the experts was that the financial flows into the water sector need to at least double in order 
to reach the MDGs. The report provoked large discontent among NGOs and the civil society. 
They claimed that the experts focused too strongly on large infrastructure projects and on 
almost exclusively the private sector. Further, the experts are accused to talk down the public 
sector and its services and that they left the problem of poverty fairly out, to name just a few 
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of them. The World Bank concluded contrarily to further promote private sector participation 
to increase efficiency and performance.106 In 2003 the European Commission stated likewise 
that competition in the water sector should bring lower prices, security of distribution and 
higher rates of employment. The Commission is pushing for a liberalised water market but 
not implicitly for a privatisation. Katzmayr assumes that ideological and vested interests 
stand behind the positive attitude of the EU towards privatisation and liberalization, Interests 
of consumers and workers are standing against the ones of companies and corporations. 
Economic interests are not necessarily superficial.107 
Another important international player is the World Trade Organization (WTO). The 
organisation currently incorporates 153 member states and builds a framework to negotiate 
and settle trade agreements. These agreements, negotiated and signed by the bulk of the 
world’s trading nations, form the heart of the WTO. 108  One agreement, the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), is dealing with cross-border services, such as 
water provision or sanitation services. The EU is meanwhile abstaining from the liberalisation 
of water services within the framework of GATS, because of the pressure by the civil society. 
But the EU is at the same time requesting the very same matter from developing countries 
and newly industrialising countries.109 This is indeed a controversial demand.110 
3.3.4 PRIVATE COMPANIES 
Private companies are interested in privatisation and PPPs because it is their chance to 
enter a market and to make profits. A private company needs to make profits and the general 
objective is to maximize it. As part of a PPP or as a purely private operator, a firm has an 
incentive to increase the water price as high as possible and to keep the compliance with the 
regulator to a minimum.111 
Another reason for a company to enter into the water market was already mentioned in 
chapter one. The water sector can be an opportunity for multi-utility-corporations to enter 
liberalised markets such as gas or energy.  
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A private company unusually aims to start a community project. When such things are done, 
then this is part of a Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) strategy. CSR has no clear 
definition but can be broadly defined as the sum of all potential measures to secure the 
social legitimacy of a business.112 CSR stands in conflict with the shareholders' mission. If 
only those CSR projects are carried out from which a direct financial benefit results, the 
critical stakeholder group will probably not take it seriously. In contrast, CSR projects that 
focus on philanthropic aspects cannot be justified on financial benefits.113 This is also a 
problem regarding development policies. Companies assign priority to other criteria than 
international development goals. The demands of funders and market conditions are much 
more important than e.g. pro-poor strategies.114 
Ownership Financing Duration
Public Utility public public public public unlimited maximum
Service Contract public public public 1 – 2 years
Management Contract public private public public 3 – 5 years
Lease Contract public private public shared 8 – 15 years
Concession public private private private 25 – 30 years
private private private private 20 – 30 years
Joint Ownership unlimited
Full Privatisation private private private private unlimited minimum
Operation and 
Maintenance
Business 
risk
Government 
involvement
public and 
private
Build-Operate-Transfer or 
Build-Own-Operate-Transfer
public and 
private
public and 
private
public and 
private
public and 
private
 
Table 1: Different forms of private sector involvement 
3.4 PRIVATISATION IN PRACTICE 
Table 1 shows different forms of private involvement in the water sector. Responsibilities are 
shifted from the state to the market. A complete shift is a full privatisation. A total sale to the 
private sector is rare but has taken place in the UK. Joint ownership of state and private 
partners is also possible. Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) projects are for example the 
construction and operation of a water or sewerage treatment plant. The private company is 
responsible for constructing the infrastructure and manages continuing operation afterwards. 
At the end of the contract the ownership is transferred to the government.115 Very common 
forms are concessions or leases where the private entity operates and maintains the 
services, collects the revenues and gains a profit for doing so. In the case of a management 
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contract the private company is paid a fee for managing the business but does not collect the 
revenues.116 Service contracts are usually smaller arrangements where only tasks like the 
collection of charges are outsourced. Public-Private Partnerships are in the majority of cases 
run as concessions or BOT projects.117 
Generally these contractual arrangements are hard to dissolve, e.g. in the case of non-
compliance it is difficult because of legal constraints and administrative processes involved. 
Examples for such cases are Cochabamba (Bolivia) or Grenoble (France), where dissolving 
concession contracts took several years.118 The mere length of these contracts stands in 
opposition to competition, which in theory should bring lower prices, security of distribution 
and higher rates of employment.  
Meanwhile a full privatisation is not desired any more by the citizens and thus by the 
politicians. There is a widespread opposition to privatisation in the water sector. It seems that 
the public is aware of the underlying conflicts. People do not have the demand of a more 
ethical behaviour by corporations but are totally against a corporate involvement in this 
sector. The great opposition against privatisation has led to a change. Prasad describes it 
this way, “[T]he high level of privatisation failure, especially in the water sector, has led the 
pro-privatisation lobby to do some soul-searching. It is now accepted that it does not matter 
who controls the network, but that it should be run like a business with equity principles. ”119 
That is the reason why we will look into this amendment in greater detail. The new forms of 
privatisations are PPPs and corporatisation. The ownership of the public utilities stays public 
but the operations become private or are carried out in the manner of a private company. 
3.4.1 PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
PPPs can be defined as “agreements where public sector bodies enter into long-term 
contractual agreements with private sector entities for the construction or management of 
public sector infrastructure facilities by the private sector entity, or the provision of services 
(using infrastructure facilities) by the private sector entity to the community on behalf of a 
public sector entity.”120 In a PPP the control over a facility is transferred to the private 
company. The public sector organization acts as the purchaser, the private sector partner 
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adopts the role of a supplier.121 Both try to achieve common complementary goals. The 
public partner has a controlling function and the possibility of co-determination. The private 
part can make profits because of economic and/or technical innovations. Then again the 
private company takes over several risks because of the incentive to make profits.122 
There are two ways a PPP can work: Either it is based on existing facilities or new 
infrastructure is built. The infrastructure is then operated and owned by the private entity 
alone or in a joint venture between government and the private actor. The public sector 
defines and specifies the available services of the facility. The private actor then provides the 
services for a defined period of time. After this period the control over the facility is re-
transferred to the public entity.123  
2.4.1.1 COSTS AND RISKS 
A widespread assumption seems to be that PPPs do not produce costs to the public. This 
myth takes various forms, e.g. that the construction costs of PPP projects are not paid by the 
public (authorities. Another one is the opinion that authorising PPPs would allow the 
government or municipalities to spend more money on other services. But PPPs have to be 
paid just as projects managed directly by public authorities.124 They are not free of charge. 
PPPs need to be set up, the details have to be negotiated and renegotiated, and they have 
to be monitored by a public authority. These transaction costs are relatively high. They 
comprise legal, consulting and financial costs. Included are the identification, allocation and 
mitigation of the performance and political risks involved for the private operator, its 
shareholders, and the project financiers. These efforts can mount up to 10 % of the whole 
project costs.125 
A company joining in a PPP is usually found via tendering. This starting phase is prone to 
bribery and corruption. It is very likely that companies underestimate the expected costs of 
investments and overestimate the expected demand for the service. Sometimes “loss 
leaders” or unrealistic bids are submitted in a tendering process. Companies act this way in 
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order to get a project approved or to be the best bidder.126 Not till the project is scooped up 
the real costs come to light. 
In terms of water provision, which is a natural monopoly, it is in all likelihood that customers 
are overcharged. This can also be proven empirically looking at the water sector in France. A 
study covered up that in 2004 the price of water under PPPs was 16.6% higher compared to 
areas where municipalities provided such service. Also the IMF stated that it is possible that 
the private sector is overcompensated because the government overprices risk and thus the 
costs of a PPP increase.127 
There can be hidden costs such as financial support to the private company in form of cash 
contributions in the construction phase, subsidies during the operation phase or a favourable 
tax regime. Public authorities also often provide financial guarantees to minimise the risk of 
the private sector.128 It is also possible that the public operator which is due to become a 
PPP is fully disencumbered of all debts in order to guarantee the PPP a “fresh” and smooth 
start. 
Profits are generally extracted out of the water system. These profits are not reinvested and 
thus lost for the community/state. This can be observed by looking at the private investments 
into the water sector. World Bank officials have recognised that private investments in water 
and sanitation services have been very low in the 1990s and that the vast majority of 
financial funding is done and will be done by the public sector.129 Private capital flows into 
the water supply and sanitation have been very unsteady between 1987 and 2003. They 
reached a peak in 1997 with over 8 billion USD and fell under one billion USD in 2003. This 
money did not go into the poorest regions or in regions with the lowest levels of access but in 
countries such as Argentina, the Philippines, Malaysia or Chile. These are countries which 
are not ranked as very poor. This shows that foreign capital is interested in large markets 
with low risk.130 Some representatives of multinational water companies have also admitted 
that they define themselves more as service providers and not as financiers.131 
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For leasing operations, BOTs, concessions and a full privatisation, good information and a 
strong capacity for regulation and coordination is needed.132 The water quality standards, 
prices and service levels need to be monitored and thus the community or the state needs to 
have the regulatory oversight. Thus, labour and capital costs occur which are borne by the 
regulatory agencies. Direct administrative and compliance costs are paid by the private and 
the public sector. There are also indirect costs incurred by private sector organizations and 
consumers as a result of both implementing the regulations and trying to avoid them.133 A 
private firm is attracted by a slack regulation because this offers the possibility to make 
profits. From a business perspective, the more charitable a company has to be, the less 
attractive is this activity for it because it does not directly bring a profit. 
Another aspect is the costs of money itself. In almost every country borrowing money is 
cheaper for governments than for private companies. This implies the fact that governments 
face less risk of defaults. Private companies can go bankrupt more easily and that is why 
they pay higher interest rates for credits. Therefore a PPP always starts with a certain 
handicap which it can only offset by lower operating costs.134 
In case of an infrastructure PPP, the construction costs have to be paid by the public. These 
costs are generally high because the transfer of construction risk is paid for by the 
government or a municipality. The certainty of an on-time delivery which is within budget 
increases these costs substantially.135 Altogether, infrastructure projects have to face risks in 
the following areas: technique, construction, operation, revenues, finance, politics, 
environment or force majeure. It is possible that engineering or design failures occur or that 
the construction is faulty or delayed. The operating and maintenance costs can be higher as 
calculated. Different reasons can lead to a shortfall of revenues, for example the volatility of 
prices. Financial risks derive from inadequate hedging of revenue streams or investment 
costs. Changes to the legal regulations or of government policies can occur. The operations 
can have adverse environmental impacts or hazards. Finally, force majeure which stands for 
extraordinary events or circumstances beyond the control of the parties is a risk of a PPP.136 
It is evident that a risk transfer is not for free: a great part of the risks of PPPs originate from 
the complexity of the arrangement itself. Documentation, financing, taxation, technical 
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details, sub-agreements, and so on, are involved and the nature of the risks varies over the 
time period of the project.137 A PPP contract cannot cover all possible circumstances and 
problems with the delivery of the service, particularly when the contract runs over 25 or 30 
years. In the end the public authority has the responsibility for maintaining the service and 
repaying the bankers, no matter what happens to the private partner.138 This is probably the 
greatest risk of a PPP. Another risk results from macroeconomic instability. It is hard to 
calculate a price for water which is appropriate to the private operator is at the same time not 
too expensive for disadvantaged consumers and which is generally adequate to the 
economy.139  
It is important to evaluate if the benefits of the risk transfer to the private partner are higher 
than the costs of this action. PPPs are feasible if a reliable, long-term revenue stream can be 
established. The projected revenues are one of the greatest risks of such a project.140  
3.4.2 CORPORATISATION 
Another process that has taken place in many countries where a full privatisation of water 
services was not desired is a formal privatisation or corporatisation. The idea of 
corporatisation is to capture the advantages of a privately run company, e.g. efficiency, 
productivity, and financial sustainability; while retaining government accountability. A 
corporatized company “has to emulate the behavior of a private company.” Thus, it becomes 
more or less a private company because it adopts key corporate characteristics: “corporate 
governance; a separate legal entity or company at least partially owned by government 
(often local government); modern financial management and accounting practices; customer 
orientation; and effective and transparent use of data to assess and monitor performance.”141 
Corporatisation is one request of the New Public Management philosophy. This approach 
discusses ways to lift the barrier between state and market in order to modernise the state.142 
Corporatized entities in the water sector are independent business units for water services 
operating separate from municipalities or governments. The public operator is run under a 
private-law organisational form but rests to 100% in public hands. Katzmayr describes this as 
a separation of the municipal council, the public sphere and local parliamentary control. For 
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him it is the first step towards material privatization. It is a form of learning from an 
economically-led behaviour and the problem is that only monetary and short-term goals are 
pursued.143 When water is commoditised it is thereupon only available to those who can 
afford it. Thus the citizen becomes a customer. The idea behind this is to offer citizens more 
choices, e.g.: in the selection of services, in the way how to interact with the water provider 
and in the selection of the water provider itself. Critics believe that the market logic 
introduced into the water management is incompatible with guaranteeing citizen's basic right 
to water. Their key argument is that private companies will manage water in a less 
sustainable way.144 Furthermore, the impression that there is no need for public utilities 
owned by the general public becomes stronger. More and more public institutions are 
released to self-governance but receive at the same time high subsidies. It is feared that the 
process of corporatisation moves water operators out of the grasp of the citizens but they 
have to pay for them nevertheless. 
3.4.3 OUTCOMES 
3.4.2.1 FAILURES AND CORRUPTION 
Prasad lists a collection of failed takeovers by private water companies: Buenos Aires, 
Atlanta, Manila, Cochabamba, Jakarta, Nelspruit, Kelantan, Mozambique, Nkokebde, 
Conakry, Gambia, Parana, Trinidad and Tobago, Belize, La Paz, and Dar es Salaam. 145 
This compilation is not really creating confidence and shows that private sector involvement 
in the water sector does not have a good reputation. As seen with hidden costs of PPPs, the 
private sector is often associated with bribery, corruption, non-compliance with contracts, lay-
offs, price increases or environmental pollution. In most cases the contracts need to be 
renegotiated and the World Bank has even published a manual how to renegotiate a failed 
contract.146  Furthermore the World Bank states that “the privatisation process itself can 
create corrupt incentives.” It lists the possibilities to bribe in order to be favoured in bidding 
processes or to obtain a low assessment of the public property that is leased off.147 It shows 
that in the water sector, corruption is closely associated to the awarding of contracts. The two 
French multinationals Veolia and Suez have both been convicted of corruption for trying to 
obtain long-term water concessions in France, Italy and in the USA. Thames-Water was 
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confined for collusion in awarding contracts in Chile and in Indonesia. 148  To sum up, 
privatisation increases the incentive and the opportunity for corruption and bribery. 
3.4.2.2 OUTCOMES CONCERNING PERFORMANCE AND EFFICIENCY 
Studies on privatisation show that this measure generally contributes to improving 
performance at the company level but that it is insufficient to raise economic performance by 
itself. It is certain that the ownership for itself does not determine the performance. There are 
other contributing factors such as leadership or commitment by the workers. 
In general, there is no statistical evidence that the efficiency of private water operators is 
higher than of public ones. Even the IMF stated that it cannot be taken for granted that PPPs 
are more efficient compared to public investment or government supply of services.149 One 
study published by the World Bank affirms that PSP in infrastructure did not take social 
issues into account. Another study recognises that total welfare reached with PSPs is not 
shared with the poor.150 
3.4.2.3 OUTCOMES CONCERNING THE POOR 
The evidence on the implications of privatisation on poverty is contradictory. Several studies 
are documenting that all categories of the population could benefit from privatisation because 
it leads to improvements in access and coverage, efficiency and quality. Other studies show 
negative consequences for the poor such as job losses, decreases in income or reduced 
access to basic services.151 This means that poor people and small businesses can be 
priced out of the market. There is also only little evidence that low-income groups are any 
better off in the case of a private provision. Moreover, these groups are often explicitly 
excluded from the service area covered by the contracts.152  
For poorer citizens the calculations of the tariffs is of great importance. Efficient and cost-
covering tariffs are not implicitly sustainable and reasonable. In industrial countries the costs 
for water constitute only a minor part of the household expenses. In developing countries this 
part is usually much higher. When prices of water rise, this increases inequality because of 
the low-income elasticity applying to water. Water consumption varies very little with income 
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because the individual water needs are too similar.153 When water stays in public hands it is 
possible to redistribute and to provide access to water explicitly for poorer groups. It is not 
easy to motivate companies to act accordingly. From a philosophical view it can be argued 
that privatisation prefers the non-poor because it is profit-motivated and is thus not targeting 
on equity and social justice. The extension of the water network and the connection of new 
households, which are not able to afford the full economic cost, pose a potential risk to a 
private company's profitability.154 So it can be found that the number of new household 
connection to the pipeline network achieved with private finance in regions such as Asia or 
Sub-Saharan Africa is minor. 
PSI states that private companies offer their services primarily in large cities and serve the 
poor only when governments pay for it or provide multiple guarantees. Holland argues, “It 
would be better if the rich in these countries subsidise their own poor instead of subsidizing 
shareholders in Europe.”155 This means that governments in the global South should abstain 
from PPPs and work on a way to subsidize the poor instead of turning to private investors 
(from the North).  
It appears that especially in areas allowing to achieve profits easily, contracts are concluded 
with private suppliers.156 The less attractive business of servicing the poor is often done 
including the element of participation. This saves costs and safeguards payment acceptance. 
Main goal is to increase developmental funds to influence decisions of a population regarding 
its access to water services. At the same time, an economical and environmental aware 
consumer culture is promoted, together with a rising sensitisation that water has an 
economic value and that services associated with it have to be paid by the water users.157 
The strategy to treat water as a commodity is challenging with a refusal by the civil society. 
The protest comes along with the resistance to a commodification of public goods. Generally, 
when water and other public goods and services are charged then the wealthier citizens are 
those who are able to pay and the poorer ones are dealing with a serious problem. Facing 
the wealth differences within local communities and nation-states as well as globally between 
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the North and the South, the allocation via market-forces poses the risk that the poor pay for 
the water consumption of the rich.158 
3.4.2.4 OUTCOMES CONCERNING REGULATION 
The actors who are pro privatisation usually blame weak regulations whenever a privatisation 
fails. In developing countries it was often overlooked that the regulatory governance had not 
been well developed prior to a privatisation. However, effective regulation and regulatory 
governance is needed for the desired market-led development. Furthermore effective and 
efficient institutions are necessary but their formation takes time, even in developed 
countries.159 A regulation body is usually centralized, bureaucratic and often too big. If water 
stays in public hands, this body does not need to be installed. As argued before, bribery is 
very common in the water sector. If there are no profits to be made, corruption can be 
prevented. Besides, the more efficiently a regulation system works, the less interested are 
private companies to participate in a tender process because their cost benefits cease to 
exist. 
Privatization leads to a relocation of regulation, away from the political sphere to a shadowy 
and unaccountable world, as Stoker puts it. 160  The decision-making is privatized. This 
measure allows only short-term gains for tax-payers. The focus just lies on quantifiable 
values and not on the provision of public services for a meaningful human existence. 
Furthermore, citizens do not have a real choice between suppliers because concessions are 
granted without the concerning their opinion. Citizens are not only just consumers but have 
the right of information, of hearing and of interaction within the decision-making process. In 
addition politicians loose information and cannot achieve learning effects any more. Also the 
municipalities loose strategic competences.161 Private companies prefer confidentiality and 
secrecy in order to protect their ability to maximize the own benefit. They usually insist on 
secret contracts.162 
3.4.2.5 OUTCOMES CONCERNING THE WORKERS 
Private companies were expected to reduce the number of workers because this was seen 
as a meaningful cost-cutting measure. Banks and analyst propose a low number of workers 
as a measure for a better performance. Hence the standard measure which is employees per 
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thousand connections does not take into account if a water operator carries out its own 
construction or if this part is outsourced. Furthermore, extending services and providing a 
better service quality often derives from extra workers.163 When the number of workers is 
reduced and the output stays the same, this is not a problem from an economic point of view. 
However, same output does not mean that the quality of the work stays the same. And a 
sharp reduction of personnel does not automatically imply improved efficiency. Qualified staff 
and adequate levels of workers are indispensable. A lack of qualified personnel can lead to 
physical losses or poor service.164 Water services, like any other service, need a accurately 
paid, trained and stable workforce.165 
3.4.2.6 OUTCOMES CONCERNING THE ENVIRONMENT 
There are no ecological arguments brought up supporting privatization or liberalization of the 
water management. Only economic reasons are under consideration. The opponents of 
privatization are against experiments that may risk the ecological and social functionality of 
water.166 There is for example a tension between company strategies and public policies 
concerning leakages and water stress. Companies expect very little benefits from reducing 
their leakages but from small savings in power and chemicals. The costs are high and there 
are no immediate benefits to except.167 Another example is the use of ground water. From 
an economical point of view it would be more viable to use the water of larger ground water 
resources and stop taking water from smaller and less cost-efficient sources. This poses the 
risk of a loss of protection zones and a risk of excessive exploitation.168 
The question to ask is why sticking to private involvement when it only costs more and 
creates probably not any efficiency gains? The option to reform public providers through in-
house restructuring and partnerships while keeping full public ownership and control was for 
a long time overlooked or ignored. This reasonable option will be explained in the next 
chapter. 
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4. PUBLIC-PUBLIC PARTNERSHIPS 
As we have seen in chapter two, neither privatisation nor PPPs fulfil their promises to 
improve the water services beneficial to the society and both can to the contrary cause huge 
problems. When a utility is privatised or reformed into a PPP, several costs and risks arise to 
the operator, the government, the municipality and the society.  
A totally different concept for the improvement of public water services are Public-Public 
Partnerships (PUPs). In the last years more and more publications mention PUPs as 
examples of well-running partnerships. Literature reviewing on PUPs start in the early 2000s 
but the concept is much older. One of the first PUPs was founded in the 1980s by Lilongwe 
(Malawi) and the UK's Severn Trent.169 It seems that in the water sector PUPs have, on the 
one side, originated as a response to PPPs and privatisation in general.170 On the other side, 
the concept of city twinning, which came up after World War II, was also an initiator for 
PUPs. The idea of collaboration between municipalities seems to have provided the political 
fundament for these partnerships regarding the water sector.171 
The appearance of PUPs is a movement towards a different image of the public sector which 
is often talked down to be inefficient, bureaucratic, slow and inflexible - all objections for 
investing in the private sector. This attitude is in my view omnipresent in Western societies. 
Miranda also says, “The disparagement of the public sector has left an ingrained cultural bias 
against the public sector within donor governments and institutions which is difficult to 
change.”172  
This chapter starts with a discussion of the concept of PUPs, its different partnership types 
as well as partnership arrangements that can be made. David Hall identified over 130 PUPs 
in the water sector in more than 70 countries. The existing PUPs have different 
characteristics - each one distinguishes in certain points from all the others. These 
characteristics and the associated ideas, which are explained in the literature, are discussed 
in the following part of this thesis. Additionally, their accuracy is analysed using a case 
example of a Swedish and a Lithuanian operator. 
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4.1 THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC-PUBLIC PARTNERSHIPS 
In the latest publication of the Transnational Institute and the Public Services International 
Research Unit, PUPs are defined as “the collaboration between two or more public 
authorities or organizations, based on solidarity, to improve the capacity and effectiveness of 
one partner in providing public water or sanitation services.”173 Boag and McDonald define it 
slightly differently. For them a PUP is a “twinning arrangement with a stated non-profit motive 
that aims to improve water services in one or more of the partner regions and which includes 
only public partners.”174 The second definition is more precise and does not include the mere 
normative approach of solidarity. This notion is not the solely important feature of PUPs 
because the core of the concept is created according the fact that two (or more) public 
partners are collaborating and that profit-seeking is explicitly excluded. The partners come 
together and state that they are not motivated by commercial goals. 
When we focus on a neoclassical view, we can say that a PUP has the objective to maximise 
the consumers' surplus.175 This leads to a maximization of welfare gains. Water generally 
has a high consumers' surplus because people would pay a very high price for water 
(especially for the first litres in order to survive) but they are usually paying a lot less than 
their actual willingness to pay as low-income elasticity applies to water. What is more, in a 
PUP there is no need for growth of annual income or growth of annual profit. Only a need for 
the growth of the knowledge and of efficiency exists. 
PUPs are generally not managing agents for large-scale infrastructure projects or for 
implementing specific policies like cost-recovery mechanisms. Their aim is to provide local 
management and workers with the essential skills to discover problems and find appropriate 
solutions to overcome them.176 Know-how transfer takes place in a very cost-effective way. 
PUPs can work either on national or international level. The initiators of a PUP differ from 
case to case. It can be the public operator which takes the lead or politicians who want to 
improve public water services. In the case of Stockholm Vatten which was a supporting 
operator in Kaunas (Lithuania) and Riga (Latvia), the PUP process started at the political 
level. An international initiative aimed to coordinate multilateral and bilateral cooperation. 
This was followed by a political mandate given to Stockholm Vatten to be the supporting 
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partner for the two Baltic operators. The municipal, national and international political 
initiatives attracted international finance and bilateral grants.177 For PUPs in general, the 
initiation by trade unions, NGOs178, community representatives or other civil society groups 
or individuals is also possible. 
In principle, in a PUP the public ownership and management of operations are retained. But 
in most published examples of PUPs it is not clear who is meant with 'public': state and non-
state-actors are often mingled together and no delimitation is made. As a consequence 
different notions of the public domain are mixed.179 A reason could be that the concept is 
relatively new. 
In general we can see that the interpretations of 'public' and 'private' change within the social, 
political and economic context. 180  Shifts in economic policy and politics redraw the 
boundaries of the public sphere and public institutions. This includes boundary shifts such as 
the formation of neoliberalism or the rise of business and financial news coverage, shifts 
from seeking government regulation of corporations or via organized labour to directly 
targeting corporations through public dispute.181 Different interests are behind each step in 
the direction towards more public or more private involvement. This is also a reason for the 
unclear delimitation of public and private in the PUP concepts. Different vested interests try 
to form the water sector according to their advantage. 
Nevertheless, public can be seen in two ways, either from the view of Habermas or from an 
institutional perspective. Habermas argues that the state authority is the executor of the 
public sphere but is not a part of it. State authority is normally seen as public but its task to 
care for the well-being of all citizens can be derived especially from the aspect of the public 
sphere. State and public sphere are not the same but rather opponents. The public sphere is 
responsible for non-governmental opinion-making. The public sphere is “the realm of our 
social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed.”182 It is restricted by 
the private sphere on one side and the realm of secrecy on the other. The second term 
stands for the back rooms of power of public authority: interpersonal power networks and 
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legal restrictions through censorship and repression.183 Contrary to that view, I have chosen 
an institutional perspective and equate public water services with state ownership of facilities 
and resources. This definition includes ownership by community groups and other non-state 
actors in order to expand the conventional boundaries of public ownership.184 Boag and 
McDonald propose to use the term 'public' only for state entities that are publicly owned, 
managed, financed, and stand under political control and oversight. “Examples of this include 
government bodies and departments (at all levels of state), state utilities and parastatals, and 
state development agencies (bilateral, multilateral) with a mandate to serve all residents in a 
given geographic area.“185 In this paper I only analyse PUPs which include these kinds of 
public partners but I will give a brief overview over other PUP forms. In addition, the above 
definition does include corporatised entities which are described in chapter two. As this kind 
of outsourcing has become very common, it is not possible to exclude it. However, 
corporatisation can be highly problematic because it restricts the public to influence political 
processes and thus it turns the citizen into a mere customer. A PUP with a corporatised 
entity as one partner is probably not excluded of the profit-maximization aim. Only monetary 
and short-term goals are pursued. 
4.2 PARTNERSHIP TYPES 
In table 2, based on the illustration of Boag and McDonald, some examples of PUPs 
classified according to their spatial and organisational dimension are shown. 186 Looking at 
the type of organisation, we see co-operations between public-authorities which are most of 
the time municipal water providers, and partnerships between non-state-actors. 
Geographically there are PUPs within one country either doing business in the North or in the 
South and such working across borders. First, we look at the organisational scale of PUPs. 
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    Spatial scale 
    
Domestic Partnership Multinational Partnership 
O
rg
a
n
is
a
tio
n
a
l s
ca
le
 
Public-authority 
+ Public-
authority 
Municipal water provider and 
national water department 
Municipal water providers of two 
countries 
Public-authority 
+ Non-state 
entity 
Municipal water provider and a 
trade union or an NGO 
National water department and an 
NGO from another country 
Non-state-entity 
+ Non-state 
entity 
Water coopartive and an NGO in the 
same municipality 
Unions from two countries 
Multi-
Partnerships 
Municipal water provider and a 
trade union and a local community 
group 
Regional water provider and an 
NGO with a regional water provider 
of another country 
    
North, South North-North, North-South, South-South, South-North 
Table 2: Types of Public-Public Partnerships 
4.2.1 ORGANISATIONAL SCALE 
As the responsibility for water and sanitation is lying at different levels of government, PUPs 
can be launched at different levels as well. A public-authorities partnership187 involves public 
authorities of the same type and level such as collaborations of municipal operators or of 
different types and levels. Common examples are a national water department or provincial 
authorities.188 Publicly owned and managed PUPs of this kind can, for instance, be found in 
Honduras, South Africa, Malaysia and Brazil. Such cooperation is often created because of 
twinning arrangements between cities or communities.189 
In contrast to formal state actors, other civil society organisations can also be part of a PUP. 
These non-profit private entities include non-state and non-commercial organisations. 
Examples are community-based organisations, NGOs, churches, foundations, social 
movements, academic institutions, trade unions, and other local actors. These actors are no 
formal public institutions but form a part of the wider public and have become institutions with 
a strong public acknowledgement.  
                                               
187
 Public-authorities partnerships can also be named as Public Utility Partnerships or Public Operator 
Partnerships (POPs). 
188
 TNI, CEO 2006:8; Lobina, Hall 2006:6 
189
 Hall, Lobina 2006b:7-8 
 50 
There are also governmental organized NGOs representing hybrid cases within this 
definition. All these non-profit private actors work independently of the formal public sector 
and provide service to a particular set of group interests.190 They are included within this 
concept when they work on a non-profit basis. In general, non-state entities play an important 
role as part of the civil society. NGOs can build political support for PUPs among 
governments and donors. They can also serve as a link between public operators especially 
in the North and in the South. NGOs and trade unions191 can for instance take over the 
monitoring business to ensure that PUPs stay public and non-profit.192 
Next to NGOs are other entities that are called not-for-profit organisations. Their intention is 
not to make profits for private gain. But it is possible that such an organization makes in fact 
a profit from time to time. However it is not the principal purpose for which it is constituted.193 
Including these organisations is probably weakening the concept of PUPs and opens it up for 
private companies. But this requires deep analyses in every specific case which would go 
beyond the limits of this thesis. In summary, organisations that work for profit are excluded 
from the concept of Public-Public Partnerships. A partnership with a commercially operating 
partner resembles to a PPP and is therefore not a PUP. The disadvantages that can arise 
with an eventual inclusion of the private sector, happening in the case for WOPs, are 
discussed in chapter four. 
To date, these partnerships between public authorities and non-state actors only exist on the 
domestic level, usually between a municipal authority and a locally based association aiming 
for an improvement of the water services in the community. Partnerships between trade 
unions or NGOs and public water authorities are also mostly established on a local level. On 
a national level, the question of water is typically not interesting for citizens. Back on a local 
level however, people are personally affected and thus interested. This fact supports the idea 
of community involvement. Co-operations between non-state-actors are also highly localized. 
However, there is one example of such an international PUP, namely between Dushtha 
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Shasthya Kendra and WaterAid in Dhaka, Bangladesh. The aim of this partnership was to 
expand water services to informal settlements.194 
A special constellation is a multi-partnership because very different objectives, attitudes and 
operation methods collide. The co-operation of Odi municipal water utility in South Africa with 
the regional water board Rand Water and the local and national trade union is an example 
for a domestic multi-partnership.195 
What also needs to be taken into account is that it makes a difference if two state-actors like 
municipalities or a municipality and a NGO work together. The reason is that in the first case 
the two partners possess in-house expertise on municipal affairs which the NGO is 
lacking.196 However, difference can also be a driver for change. 
4.2.2 SPATIAL SCALE 
When we look at spatial possibilities of PUPs we can find domestic partnerships in only one 
country and multinational partnerships in two or more countries. 
A) DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS 
Domestic partnerships have various characteristics. They are usually established because of 
geographical proximity. Study tours and visits are easier and cheaper to arrange. The 
communication is presumably uncomplicated due to a common language and/or a common 
working culture. Moreover the socio-economic and the hydrological context are similar. With 
nearly the same economic situation the partners face related constraints and challenges.197 
In addition, within the same country the legal framework does usually not vary. 
An example for a public-authority-partnership in one country is the Tamil Nadu Water Supply 
and Drainage Board (TWAD) cooperating with other state utilities in India. In 2004 the 
Palangarai village in the Coimbatore District of Tamil Nadu launched a programme to change 
their water system. For the period of one year the villagers organised meetings involving all 
local stakeholders, regardless of their position, sex or age. The water engineers of TWAD 
provided technical know-how and information. The villagers then decided to plant trees in 
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order to lift the water levels. This aim was reached. Illegal tapping, which was also a big 
problem, could be stopped. The transparent and improved water distribution leads to a 100% 
collection of annual taxes.198 
B) MULTINATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS 
Multinational PUPs combine partners of different countries. The following combinations are 
possible: North-South, South-South, South-North, North-North. The first direction stands for 
the supporting partner and the second for the supported partner. North and South name the 
wealthy and non-wealthy parts of the world. 
4.2.3 DIGRESSION ON THE NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE 
The North-South divide describes two economic differently developed spheres of the world. 
On the one hand is the wealthy North, made up of economically developed countries. On the 
other hand stands the less wealthy South, made up by less developed countries. The 
geographical designations result from the fact that most wealthier countries are located in the 
North (exceptions are for example Australia and New Zealand) and the less wealthy states 
are situated in the global South. However, the North-South divide is not absolute in a 
geographical sense but a pure economic distinction.199 If the aggregation of countries of 
Africa, Asia and Latin America is an appropriate way to explain certain developments, is a 
complicated question but answering it would lead to far in this thesis.200  
Having addressed this question, we can turn to the partnerships in the North and in the 
South. 
NORTH-SOUTH PUP: 
These partnerships are generally considered to be instruments that help develop and build 
capacity in partner organisations and companies in the South. A transfer of technique and 
knowledge from North to South is intended. In the field of international development this 
concept has become omnipresent. During the 20th century international co-operations where 
renamed and re-designed dissociating themselves from paternalistic approaches towards 
joint concepts. Partnerships should stress equality and promote recipient partners to assume 
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leadership and take on ownership according to their development strategies.201 In theory, 
these partnerships are based on the idea of joint ownership of interventions and not on aid 
conditionality. 202  The northern partner should avoid a dominant and intervening role. 
However, these intentions did not turn out to last. The structural inequalities are still 
persistent in North-South partnerships because the North retains further financial, 
technological and institutional advantaged over the South.203 
North-South PUPs originated in the 1980s and existed long before an academic discussion 
of PUPs began. Within these kinds of partnerships an operator from the global South has the 
aim to improve its infrastructure and/or capacity and receives help by an operator (or another 
water organisation) from the global North. The supporting partner cares for facilitating inter-
cultural exchange for the workforce of the own utility or for increasing the international 
experience of the workers out of social or professional reasons.  
PUPs provide a development for water operators in the South with regard to knowledge 
transfer, effective restructuring of public utilities, democratization of public utilities and 
solidarity building amongst public operators. Municipal partnerships have for example been 
identified as highly significant contexts for development education.204 Furthermore, they offer 
a possibility to redistribute chances. States could spend a part of their development budgets 
on PUPs. This would cause a huge impact with a relative small amount of money to invest 
because building capacity costs less than large infrastructure projects. 
A North-South PUP offers also another benefit. Not only southern organisations are able to 
learn. Practitioners from the North can also benefit from experiences gained in the 
partnership, for example learning from innovations in decentralised governments or coming 
to know about poor community coping and self-reliance strategies in the South. They can 
learn about user involvement in service provision in the South. Afterwards they are 
potentially able to adapt southern anti-poverty agenda to the northern context and bring 
different other insights to the North.205 An inter-cultural exchange of ideas can take place. 
One good example for a North-South PUP is the collaboration of the municipal Lilongwe 
Water Board in Malawi and the public operator Severn Trent in the UK in 1982. This was a 
World Bank funded program that focused on capacity building projects. In 1994, when the 
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program was completed, the Lilongwe Water Board took over as external adviser.206 Other 
examples are a PUP between Amsterdam Waternet and the city of Alexandria in Egypt, or a 
PUP between Sevilla's CPASE and Bolivian authorities with the aim to re-establish a public 
sector water operator in La Paz/El Alto after a failed concession.207 This provides evidence 
that PUPs are a mean to bring privatised utilities back under public control. 
There are several challenges to overcome in such a constellation. The socio-economic 
differences can be a barrier as well as the hydrological divergences. Cultural differences can 
also hinder a well-running collaboration as well as differences in size. To reach an equal 
relationship can be problematic.208 Moreover, the daily work of northern operators is usually 
to maintain and renew already existing water networks with wealthy water users. In countries 
of the South the situation is mostly totally different.209 To a large extent water users are poor 
and networks need to be constructed for the first time. 
SOUTH-SOUTH PUP: 
It is not always necessary that knowledge is provided by northern organisations. Every water 
operator has know-how to share. A partnership in the South can bring together countries with 
similar socio-economic circumstances.210 
In a partnership different inequalities can emerge such as access to resources, power 
relations, knowledge, capacities and capabilities. Different assumptions, world views, 
agendas and expectations collide. These differences are apparent in North-North, South-
South and most of all in North-South/South-North partnerships.211  In PPPs the power 
inequalities are more obvious. When a municipality in the South engages in a partnership 
with a transnational corporation the distribution of power is totally uneven. One party is much 
more powerful than the other. Boys says, “The corporations have expertise, more lawyers, 
more accountants, bigger budgets, more experience.”212 PUPs are based on a relationship 
forged around common values and objectives where profit-seeking is explicitly excluded. 
There are probably not the same asymmetric distribution of power as in North-South PUPs 
because the operators have similar backgrounds. 
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There are several examples of PUPs in the South, for instance the Argentinian water 
operator ABSA which supported the Peruvian city of Huancayo.213 This PUP aimed to 
improve the public water delivery which is characterized by high leakage rates and 
discontinuous service. The PUP still works on these problems.214 
NORTH-NORTH PUP: 
Such collaboration is similar to South-South PUPs. The partners have similar problems and 
problem solution strategies. A good and well-functioning example for a North-North 
partnership is the systematic Baltic Sea partnership of the 1990s between water operators in 
Sweden and Finland working with municipalities in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.215  
SOUTH-NORTH PUP: 
As already mentioned, the North can also learn from the South, for example in terms of 
democratisation and participation as we see it in Porto Alegre. Generally, a cooperation in 
which the northern partner has problems and asks a southern partner for help has not been 
documented but has probably already started or will start in the near future. 
4.3 PARTNERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS 
Partnerships follow the phrase that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. Organisations 
enter such an arrangement in order to improve their comparative advantages and to find win-
win solutions.216 Boag and McDonald define the partnership itself as “any substantial formal 
contractual collaboration between two or more agencies in the public and/or non- profit 
sector for the purpose of operating and/or financing the delivery of a water service over an 
extended period of time.” Such a partnership can combine two or more public entities, two or 
more non-profit entities, or a combination therefrom217, as described above. It is also defined 
that the partnership is not a loose oral engagement but a contractual state. Both partners 
show their willingness to reach their common established goals. A partnership can for 
instance be based on a contract or on a memorandum of understanding. The way of 
implementation counts. The basic idea is to respect the integrity of the local water company 
or water organisation because this partnership is about advising and engaging and not about 
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seeking management control.218  Local managers are usually not replaced by (foreign) 
experts because this can reduce the absorptive capacity of the supported partner and can 
undermine the ability to internalise knowledge for the long term.219 
To illustrate how such a partnership works, here are some further definitions. The World 
Economic Forum states that true partnerships are about sharing agendas together with 
combined resources, risks and rewards.220 For Johnson and Wilson a partnership is a 
“dynamic process through which partners have the potential to learn and thereby promote 
new forms and practices.” At worst, one partner is just copying the other but in the best case, 
partners unite their knowledge and produce totally new solutions and ideas. 
A partnership is not only based on similarities but also on differences. In the best case, 
difference can be a driver of mutuality. To realise mutual benefits, different values, 
knowledge and practices are shared. Ideally, trust, dialogue and reciprocity support this 
realisation.221 Mutual trust and respect play a major role in such partnerships. To achieve 
this time is needed. Hall found out that the most effective PUPs had the longest lead-in 
times. However, qualification of the partners and effectiveness of the accountability networks 
underlying the collaboration are key factors for success.222 An exemplary way of building 
trust can be to pursue modest goals at the beginning that can realistically be achieved. This 
reinforces the (still minor) trust which existed at the start. Without any trust, the partnership 
would not have been built. In a second phase the partners can develop more ambitious 
initiatives.223 The decision for a designated partner does not depend on the bid promising the 
lowest cost but on the most suitable water operator which can be usually identified after prior 
contacts. 
The success of a PUP depends on the supporting and also on the supported partner. 
Conscious agency is needed to make the partnership work. Further relevant for a well-
functioning partnership are the local organisational culture, the institutional framework and 
the socio-economic conditions. Particularly in the case of North-South PUPs these 
requirements need to be observed if two very different partners work together. 
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4.4 OBJECTIVES AND INCENTIVES 
The formation of PUPs can have different reasons. This section sums up the partly already 
mentioned motives for entering such a partnership. 
On the supported side the aims can be the following224 : 
1. TRAINING AND DEVELOPING OF HUMAN RESOURCES: 
Most of the public utilities which enter into such a partnership are seeking to improve their 
service quality and effectiveness. This can be achieved by training of the workforce in order 
to have a competent and committed staff and management. The absence of commercial 
considerations with regard to profit-seeking offers the possibility to concentrate resources on 
knowledge transfer. 
2. TECHNICAL SUPPORT: 
PUPs can focus on providing technical assistance like to solving problems such as leakages, 
protection of groundwater resources, waste-water treatment or to introduce quality 
management, preventive maintenance systems, improved customer relations or 
management information systems. The goal is to improve and expand water service quality 
and/or quantity and sometimes to introduce new technologies to enable take modernisation 
steps. 
3. IMPROVING EFFICIENCY AND BUILDING INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY: 
Another aim can be to build up institutional capacity of the public water sector and sanitation 
operators. The workforce is not only trained in technical areas but also receives soft skills 
trainings such as project management or on teamwork. 
4. IMPROVING PARTICIPATION: 
In some examples the objective was to develop the involvement of the public or the workers 
to enable a more responsive and effective service. Furthermore, enhanced accountability 
and transparency to citizens is sometimes intended. However, dealing with the last 
mentioned objectives, non-state actors seem to be more concerned with accountability and 
participation issues than state-actors are. 
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5. IMPROVING ACCESS TO WATER SERVICES: 
There are PUPs with the goal to expand water services connections to marginalised 
communities and to design payment plans that are affordable to all. In highly developed 
countries this is usually not a problem but in developing countries the access to water is an 
essential issue. 
6. FINANCING WATER SERVICES: 
Some PUPs where formed in order to develop alternative financing mechanisms or to use 
municipal partnerships to achieve economies of scale and compensate costs. A divisions of 
labour is occasionally an aim. Sometimes the cost-revenue structures where reviewed to 
determine them appropriately. 
7. PROTECTING AGAINST PRIVATIZATION - PUBLIC SECTOR ETHOS: 
When such an objective is set, public utilities and non-governmental partners are 
strengthened and empowered. Efforts are made to build solidarity amongst the public 
operators and the non-governmental groups to avoid a privatisation of water services. Lobina 
and Hall often state the public sector ethos as an objective for the involved partners. They 
explain public sector ethos with “pride in public sector's mission and sharing of own 
capacity”.225 
PUPs also offer the option to bring already privatized utilities back into public hands because 
the lacking knowledge at the local or municipal level can be provided by another public 
operator. 
8. ENVIRONMENTAL GOALS:  
Sometimes the protection of the environment can be an objective too. An example for this 
motive is the Baltic Sea pollution which is a common problem of Baltic and Nordic 
countries.226 
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For the aid-giving/supporting side, which offers knowledge and time, the motivation can 
be227: 
1. FINANCIAL INCENTIVES: 
The supporters can be motivated by financing and subsidy schemes by the state.228 The 
favourers receive remuneration for their services, for example also by donor agencies or by 
development banks. The contribution of the supporting partner's employees should be fully 
funded in order to receive sustained commitment. The boundaries between making profit and 
receiving an appropriate remuneration are maybe fluid but the intention is not to overtake the 
business and not a growth in profit. 
As it is not desirable to risk public money, most public operators do not tender for 
consultancy work, which the private sector has greater incentives to compete for. Thus it 
requires financial encouragement to realize the potential of public partnerships.229 
2. LEARNING AND EXPERIENCING: 
The supporting side joins a partnership to gain valuable experience which can be used either 
for other PUPs or for their own utility.230 Moreover the workforce is gaining (international) 
experience which is also beneficial to the own utility.231 It is basically an individual benefit for 
the employees.232 As said before, both sides possess the possibility to learn and thus to gain 
insights for improving the organisation. PUPs give their own staff new opportunities for 
development. 
3. SOCIAL AND PROFESSIONAL REASONS: 
Managers are also motivated for social and professional reasons. They are proud of their 
services and want to share their experiences. In their mind it is positive to be so good to be 
even a mentor for others.233 A PUP can probably also serve as a measurement of quality 
control. 
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4. MARKETING – CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: 
With a PUP a water operator can promote its expertise and raise its institutional and political 
perception. This can bring other positive effects, for example a better access to loans and it 
can raise the confidence into the public operator of the citizens at home. 
5. ALTRUISTIC REASONS: 
An operator gives a helping hand to those in need, e.g. in cases of emergency after natural 
disasters. 
6. PROTECTING AGAINST PRIVATIZATION - PUBLIC SECTOR ETHOS: 
Here the same arguments as for the aid-receiving side are valid. 
7. ENVIRONMENTAL GOALS: 
These goals can be the same as for the supported side. 
There are probably more location-specific goals of a certain PUP depending on the socio-
economic and the hydrological contexts (e.g. epidemic prevention) but the objectives given 
above provide a general overview over the incentives to form and run a PUP. 
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4.5 CHARACTERISTICS AND QUALITIES OF PUPS 
This section sums up the characteristics and qualities that apply to water partnerships and 
includes some examples of how PUPs could be effectively implemented into practice.  
4.5.1 TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
Transparency stands for “an environment in which the objectives of policy, its legal, 
institutional, and economic framework, policy decisions and their rationale, data and 
information related to monetary and financial policies, and the terms of agencies’ 
accountability, are provided to the public in a comprehensible, accessible, and timely 
manner.”234 Full transparency is very comprehensive and widespread. It comprises the 
whole organisation or company. Accountability goes hand in hand with transparency and 
means that a manager or a body is held responsible for accomplishing defined tasks and 
duties and for obeying rules and standards that are applicable to the role. Usually rewards for 
a good performance are given and consequences for an inadequate performance are 
demanded. Actions need to be reported and defined explicitly.235 Reporting is an essential 
part to get transparency and accountability related to the partner, the financiers, the 
taxpayers and other stakeholders. In a partnership where transparency is commonly agreed 
on, the partners can be held accountable if social and public service objectives are not 
reached. Whether the agreed partnership objectives are implemented can be ensured by 
monitoring. 
In Berlin, for example, the water services were partially privatised in 1999 when RWE and 
Veolia entered a PPP with the communal water operator. A citizen's initiative was 
campaigning for a publication of the signed contracts. The initiative succeeded in collecting 
the adequate amount of supporters to submit a petition for a referendum. At the beginning of 
November 2010 the mayor declared that the contract together with all the annexes and 
modification agreements will be published on the internet. However, there won't be a 
statutory disclosure obligation of contracts, decisions and side agreements for which the 
initiative is still fighting for.236 They succeeded in this particular case but further PPPs in 
Berlin are not legally obliged to publish the contracts made with the city. The initiative 
interprets the access to information on arrangements of (partly) public-owned companies as 
a citizen's right. This example shows clearly an integral advantage of the public sector in 
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contrast to the private sector. It is a fact that there is no commercial interest in secrecy 
because openness brings no negative impacts to public operators which do not stand in 
competition to other operators. Thus, all information about finances and charges concerning 
water can be made public. It is possible to give public access to all documents produced by 
the public utility. Transparency can cover up who uses and who pollutes water, what are the 
costs and who pays for them. Transparency can clearly work as a safeguard against rent-
seeking of individuals or organisations.237 
4.5.2 INSTITUTIONAL AND ORGANISATIONAL CHANGES 
An increased institutional performance should strengthen public institutions and 
administrations. Institutional and organisational change is usually accomplished in parallel 
with capacity building and investment programmes.238  Capacity building for institutional 
strengthening can be distinguished in three areas:  
• Human resource development which results from the training of staff and the 
improvement of recruitment procedures and work conditions, 
• Organisational development which comprises the change of management structures 
or of the organisational culture, 
• Capacity building that is aimed at institutional reforms which include policy and legal 
change or constitutional reform.239  
All three areas can be addressed by a PUP. Capacity building can either focus on learning of 
specific skills and competencies or be more diffuse and facilitate building confidence, 
enabling people to speak in front of others and to develop leadership. The empowerment of 
workers and managers can form a key ingredient for a wider organisational change.240 
The supporting partner plays a significant role in the organisational development of the 
supported partner. The experience with the own type of organisation will function as a role 
model for proposed changes. The financiers can also influence this attempted model in 
relation to their policy and objectives. As argued before, the integrity of the local operator 
should be preserved. 
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Some potential barriers to institutional change in the public sector are a poor communication, 
a lack of transformational leadership and a lack of individual identification with new initiatives. 
Communication is a key factor for a successful partnership and to avoid these barriers. 241 
In some cases, an appropriate socially and politically acceptable institutional change might 
require the inclusion and participation of more actors than only operators, local authorities 
and financiers.242 The local communities and representatives of the civil society could for 
instance participate in the decision-making process or in the monitoring task. 
4.5.3 PARTICIPATION AND POWER RELATIONS 
What advantages can participation bring a PUP? Luis Padron of the workers-run drinking 
and waste-water operator of the Buenos Aires province in Argentina says, “Getting the 
workers involved in the management of a public utility helps to ensure permanent planning 
and care. Participation by the users and civil society helps guarantee an appropriate 
administration.” 243 
Generally, the participation of the civil society 
in decision-making can bring in a wider range 
of voices, increase transparency and 
accountability, empower end-users and 
develop political and technical capacity.244 
The World Bank sees participation in the 
water sector as a mean that leads to 
effectiveness, efficiency, empowerment, 
equity and entitlements.245 Though not 
everybody means the same with participation. 
In reality there are different forms of 
participation. 
 
Illustration 3: Ladder of Participation 
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Arnstein defines them by using a ladder ranging from non-participation at the lowest level to 
citizen power at the highest spoke. Non-participation reflects for example manipulation or 
therapy. These are ostensible forms of participation because the people are either 
manipulated for other purposes or educated. In between the two contrasting poles stands 
tokenism which comprises the methods of informing, consultation and placation. To inform 
the citizens is a first step towards involvement. But when people are just informed or 
consulted they have no possibility to give feedbacks or enter a debate. Placation means that 
selected citizens are able to participate but the decision-making right rests at the power-
holders. Lastly, the types of citizen power are partnership, delegated power and citizen 
control, which is the maximum level that can be reached. In a partnership the power is 
redistributed by negotiation. When citizens have delegated power then they are solely 
responsible for a plan or a programme. The topmost ladder spoke stands for the self-
determination of a community.246 The ladder of participation is certainly a simplification but it 
shows that participation of citizens can have different shapes and it helps to uncover “fake” 
forms or shortcomings of a participation process. The government or a water operator may 
have the opinion that consultation suffices enough in terms of participation. Evaluations and 
studies of specific participatory processes have consistently pointed out that, at best, 
consultations are held and that the invited receive much too little support, to be able to 
participate in a self-confident, informed and accountable way.247 
A challenge required to overcome are the general barriers that hinder participation. On the 
one hand, it is possible that the power-holders do not intend to give up their privileges or 
keep on patronizing. When members of the civil society demand participation they usually 
intend to reach citizen power. 
The 'powerless' can encounter socio-economic barriers, lack adequate knowledge or have 
problems to be represented.248 Generally, power and resource differences exist across race, 
class, gender, geography and ethnic lines. It is possible that these differentials continue to 
exist or are even intensified in the course of participatory decision-making.249 Johnson and 
Wilson argue, “[...] partnerships based on learning do not circumvent issues of power 
relations between the actors, although they imply a commitment to address them.”250 What 
has to be considered concerning power relations in order to reach a well-run PUP is: There is 
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no single public voice. Primarily women are under-represented in participatory structures. 
Either because they are not authorized or the times and places of participation are 
incompatible with their home care duties, or they are already structurally discouraged to take 
the floor in public places.251 There are also other “weaker” groups of society. The access to 
resources and the right to full citizenship are absolutely not equally distributed worldwide or 
even within one single state. Many residents of developing countries have to constantly 
reiterate and negotiate their claims with the state.252 They cannot rely on a functioning legal 
or social system as it is established in most northern countries. 
A further obstacle to an equal partnership is a different viewpoint on knowledge. Inside a 
partnership knowledge is produced under several circumstances. It is “culturally, socially and 
politically produced and is continuously reformulated as a powerful normative construct. 
Knowledge is thus an accumulation of social norms, rituals and practices that, far from being 
constructed in isolation from power relations, is embedded in them (or against them).“253 
Knowledge can for example be unequally valued. The knowledge of practitioners from the 
North is often more important than the knowledge of people from the South. 254 
A study on partnerships of northern and southern NGOs found out that even when certain 
structures reinforced power asymmetries, the southern NGO could nevertheless build 
capacities and strengthen its voice and ability to affect the overall framework.255 Additionally, 
with participatory mechanisms it is possible to identify investments of value to poor 
communities and to find a consensus on the topics of tax and pricing levels and on cost 
distribution.256 It is easier to involve civil society actors such as trade unions, community 
groups or citizens in a PUP than in a private company because a public operator does not 
lose a business advantage. These partnerships can even develop out of community 
initiatives. 
A very good example of popular participation in the water sector is described by Antonio 
Miranda. In Recife in Brazil a municipal conference on water and sanitation was held in order 
to improve the water services in the city. This was a seven-month lasting process which 
involved 4000 people in 20 meetings taking place within their neighbourhood. The aim of the 
process was to come to a decision how to improve the water services. During this period the 
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stakeholders received all the information they needed to make this decision. In the end more 
than 160 decisions were voted on. On vote approved to oppose privatisation of the water and 
sanitation services. The community decided for example to install a municipal council of 
water and sanitation.257 
4.5.4 THE ROLE OF POLITICIANS 
Public operators are sensitive to elections and political changes. A new political leader is 
able to revise the way an operator is governed. To avoid this, transparency and 
accountability measures need to be enforced.258 This also helps to establish an adequate 
staff management. It is important that workers are employed because of their qualifications 
and not because of their political attempts. The problem of political interference with the 
financial system of the public operator can for example be solved by separating the accounts 
of the utility from those of the municipality or the state.259 
However, it is important that a PUP gains support from politicians, e.g to receive financial 
funding. Focusing on the PUP between ABSA (Argentina) and SEDAM (Peru), the toughest 
part was to reach an agreement at the political level. Padron says that the time scale of the 
politicians was a four years election term and safe water services should on the other hand 
remain for generations. This gap was hard to overcome.260 It can take some time to convince 
politicians of such a project and to explain the project concept. In the case of Stockholm 
Vatten-Kaunas this has taken up substantial partnership resources.261 But politicians are 
interested in their own reputation. They want to convince the voters to re-elect them. A PUP 
can help politicians to stay in office because the partnership leads to a regular and 
predictable service. Regularity and calculability are reasons in favour of bureaucracy but in 
disfavour of markets.262 If politicians do not act in terms of social-welfare-reasons they act 
because of the incentive to stay where they are. 
4.5.5 KNOWLEDGE, LEARNING AND KNOW-HOW TRANSFER 
To resume, a major aim of each PUP is to transfer know-how. One partner is seeking help 
and the other brings in knowledge and assists in certain issues. In a PUP it is intended to 
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build up competencies, skills and knowledge by the supporting partner. The knowledge-
transfer can be initiated by workshops, on-the-job training, study tours, regular contacts as 
well as training programmes in the areas of management, technology, operations, 
institutional development or strategy. The supported partner receives first-hand experience 
from another public utility or an independent organisation. Experiences as well as practices 
of problem definition and problem solution are shared. 
Commonly, learning and knowledge-transfer can take place by intention or by chance, in a 
direct or indirect way. It is an outcome as well as a process. Learning practices are 
“instrumentally copying or reproducing, adapting new knowledge for strategic purposes, as 
well as challenging old ideas and old knowledge in the transformative sense.”263 There are 
several forms of learning. Informal learning is not structured and results from daily life 
activities. It is most of the time non-intentional. Formal learning is structured and provided by 
an education or training institution. Non-formal learning is the same but is provided by other 
institutions or persons. These two forms are usually intentional. Learning-by-doing is for 
example intentional and informal. All these different forms and practices can be applied in a 
PUP. Mutual learning is desirable but most of the time the focus lies on teaching or improving 
of the southern partner in an international partnership. Unintended learning in the North (or 
South) is probably ignored and the intended organized learning in the South is seen as the 
only outcome.264 This can be a barrier to an effective knowledge-transfer because the 
mutuality is missing. 
The already existent knowledge, capacities and practice are important.  They are 
fundamental in order to induce real change in an organisation. Basically, the knowledge-
transfer should work as a process and not through several one-time events.265 Furthermore, 
it is important that the new knowledge is retained within the supported PUP beyond the 
lifetime of the partnership. One way of achieving this is to not hire external managers but 
train the present staff. As argued before, the absorptive capacity should not be reduced by a 
high employee turnover. Contracts valid of more than three years could be useful. 
The workforce of the supporting partner benefits from the partnership because they can 
widen their horizons, enrich their knowledge and experience.266 I see a partnership as a two-
sided learning process and that the ideal partnership is based on mutuality. With friendship 
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and mutual understanding the learning effect is greater. Dialogic learning where a participant 
is treated as a genuine person and not as an object of manipulation and where success is 
commonly defined, should build the framework of the learning process. 267  Nonaka 
constitutes, “The mere transfer of information will often make little sense if it is abstracted 
from embedded emotions and nuanced contexts that are associated with shared 
experiences”268 
Individual learning is easier than organisational learning. However, individual learning needs 
to be embedded organisationally. This depends highly on the structural position of the 
learner and on the willingness of the organisation or organisational unit to learn and to 
innovate. Evidently, the learning partnership works effectively, if the organisational partners 
have a learning culture into which they can feed.269 The opposite is a culture, where e.g. 
managers share information only on a need-to-know basis and where employees keep 
secrets. It would be better if people at all levels ask questions and share stories about 
successes, failures, and what they have learned.270 As argued in 3.5.1., the absence of 
commercial objectives in a PUP generally offers the space for knowledge transfer. 271 
Knowledge is not seen as a private good but can float freely and is public. Secrecy is not 
such an important issue as in the private sector because a public operator is not loosing a 
commercial advantage to the other operator or to a non-state-entity. 
4.6 COSTS AND RISKS 
PUPs are organised totally different compared to a privatisation. The costs and risks of a 
PUP are lower compared to PPPs or to a full privatisation. To form a PUP no long-winded 
negotiations and legal or consulting processes are needed. As shown in chapter two, for 
PPPs risk plays a more important role in order to safeguard the future profitability. Thus the 
financial, legal, consulting expenses and other transaction costs are important cost-factors. 
PUPs do not request complex contract(s) with profit margins. The not-for-profit basis offers 
the possibility to fully reinvest the mobilised financial resources into the local system. There 
are no profits extracted in the form of dividends or costly consultancy services. Furthermore, 
a PUP is a collaborative approach of change and this can facilitate the acceptability and 
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boost local commitment. 272 If a participation framework is created, then the effectiveness of 
a project is increasing because of cost sharing and recovery as well as of a long-term 
sustainability. Even when the community is only little participating, the costs can be lowered 
and sustainability is increasing.273 
What takes up resources is the search for an appropriate partner and to finance a PUP. 
Other costs involved are efforts to start and run a PUP. First of all, there are expenses for 
human resources. The trainers and experts need to be paid. Holding seminars and doing on-
the-job trainings take up the working time of the employees who are usually working on their 
common tasks at that time. External advisers are usually not engaged. Visits and study tours 
cause travel costs. Regarding this matter, risks play a minor role. Lobina and Hall argue that 
in terms of risk management, the activities of PUPs are only the conduction of feasibility 
studies. 274  Before starting an investment project, a local assessment of the required 
extensions and improvements is needed. This approach is quite obvious but has often been 
neglected. It is important to be aware of the local needs, otherwise the financial planning is 
conflicting with the local interests. Usually external actors assess a much higher demand for 
investment than locals. The Orangi project in Karachi in Pakistan has for example 
campaigned against a 70 million dollar project of the Asian Development Bank because they 
deemed it to be unnecessary.275 
The performance and political risk of a PUP is, like risk of PPPs, generally retained by the 
local operator and local authorities. The effectiveness of risk reduction depends on reforms 
of the organisation because the local operator stays fully responsible for the operation.276 
One could think that a risk of a PUP can arise if one partner does not stick to the contract or 
if a partner gives misinformation or even harming advice and this could cause extra-costs for 
the supported partner. But there is actually no incentive to do so and the supporting partner 
is never working alone and is not taking decisions by him/herself.  
No additional costs for regulation occur as there are no new contracts and no new 
arrangements. The deals between the two public operators are concerned with know-how-
transfer and not with the service provision itself. Furthermore, the PUP usually does not 
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modify the price structure of the operator and thus there exists no such risk like overcharging 
water users as it can be the case dealing with a PPP. 
Costs are sometimes not easy to calculate. The OECD found out in a study on Baltic 
countries that capacity building activities often involved aid in kind (flows of goods and 
services with no payment in money or debt instruments in exchange277) through institutional 
twinning and other partnerships. Often the costs for people working on development co-
operations in local governments are not explicitly displayed in the statistics.278 
Employees will not be fired en masse because there is no change in ownership and usually 
no change of the mission of the public operator. Workers are probably a cost unit but they 
are needed to keep the service provision up and running. Plus, more workers imply that the 
state does not have to pay unemployment compensations. With a transparent and 
accountable organisation, the problem of bureaucracy can be avoided. 
4.7 FINANCING PUPS 
PUPs need external financing, either from the state, from international financial institutions or 
from aid agencies. The financing of a PUP should not only be left to the initiative and 
philanthropy of an individual water operator because this can lead to financial shortages. To 
reach real change, a real commitment by state-bodies is needed. 
PSI proposes to use the pension funds in Europe to finance investment in clean water and 
sanitation. They argue, “A global water bond mechanism would be one way to enable these 
pension funds to be more fully invested in water and sanitation and this could include public-
public partnerships”.279 
4.7.1 THE ROLE OF THE FINANCIERS 
Financiers can influence PUPs in a positive or in a negative way. The conditionalities of the 
financiers affect the outcome of a PUP considerably. The suitability of different aid conditions 
to the local socio-political and economic context should be ensured in order to be 
successful.280 A negative influence, for instance, can be a “projectisation” which means that 
external funders require concrete results within a short time frame. This applied pressure can 
                                               
277
 OECD Glossary 
278
 Hall et al. 2009:4-5 
279
 TNI, CEO 2006:14 
280
 Lobina, Hall 2006:19-20 
 71 
be counterproductive to an effective joint learning process.281 A positive trend is the fact that 
development financiers demand from national authorities the willingness to work with 
participatory structures and that they integrate the recognition of participatory instruments in 
terms of binding regulations in the overall project activities.282 Participatory structures, as 
aforementioned, can help to increase the sustainability of a project. 
For the PUP between ABSA (Argentina) and SEDAM (Peru) some conditionalities imposed 
by donors figured out to be threats to the project. Several local civil society organisations 
were, because of that, trying to find alternative funding in order to avoid unintentional 
modifications and influences.283 
As seen in chapter one and two, IFIs usually give their money to projects with private sector 
involvement. Contrariwise, their agenda could really promote the public sector and enhance 
its efficiency. Particularly, because the conditions imposed by international (financial) 
organisations have a huge impact on countries in the South. It is clearly a challenge to 
convince donors to invest in capacity building and not only in infrastructure works. Miranda 
thinks that the costs of hundreds or maybe thousands of PUPs could be financed worldwide 
if the IFIs would only spend a small percentage of their annual investments budget on water 
and sanitation, and not purely on infrastructure.284 
4.8 A CASE STUDY: STOCKHOLM AND KAUNAS 
The conceptual questions are answered and at this point an empirical example will be 
discussed. In the 1990s Swedish water companies helped municipal water operators in the 
Baltic States. This project was financed by the Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency (SIDA). Above all the partnership between Stockholm Vatten (Sweden) 
and Kaunas (Lithuania) was described as an overwhelming success. The partnership 
focused on building financial and managerial capacity and on sustainable environmental 
management.285 I give a brief overview over the project and assess it with respect to the 
PUP characteristics outlined in this chapter. 
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4.8.1 COURSE OF EVENTS 
Kaunas is the second-largest city in Lithuania and had no waste-water treatment plant before 
the PUP project was launched. There were some attempts to build such and facility but only 
after the independence of the country in 1990 the municipality intensified its efforts.286 In 
1991 first talks about Swedish support for the water company of Kaunas were held 
already. 287  Three years later Kaunas Water Company (KWC) and Stockholm Water 
Company (SWC) established a twinning agreement. Overall objective of the project was to 
achieve long-term environmental effects of the investment project. This should work out 
using an independent self-sustaining municipal company.288 
In the first year, called Phase I, it was intended to prepare the project for financing and 
implementation, to prepare KWC for a joint venture with the Nordic Environment Finance 
Corporation (NEFCO) and SWC, and to initiate institutional development of KWC. The joint 
venture did however not come into effect because Kaunas City did not agree on a connection 
between loan financing and joint venture and because the political opinion stood against a 
privatisation of public entities. Furthermore SIDA informed that they could not finance such 
an arrangement. So the aim of phase II, which ran from January 1996 to the end of 1999, 
was to develop KWC into an autonomous, efficient, self-financing and self-managed but still 
public enterprise. The overall performance should be improved and SWC assisted to fulfil the 
obligations of the agreement. It was also intended to develop a commercial attitude within the 
company. Furthermore the idea that the consumers pay and not the municipality or the 
government was pursued.289 
KWC was transformed into a joint stock company and during 1996 the financial 
management, the bill collection, the administration and operation was improved. A company 
board was established but there were disagreements on tariff setting and other matters.290 
This made it impossible to fulfil all financial covenants of the loans and some project activities 
had to be postponed. Nevertheless, one year later the company had a new organisational 
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chart, less staff, changed positions for managers, and an organisational development at 
multiple departments and units.291 
After the official partnership, the EU Commission agreed to finance a part of a water 
purification plant in 2001. It was expected to cost EUR 28,2 million. The EBRD granted a 
loan of EUR 9,57 million and the Lithuanian government paid EUR 6,38 million. The EBRD 
did this without any sovereign or municipal financial guarantee. This shows that they were 
satisfied with the outcome of the PUP so far.292 
4.8.2 THE PARTNERS AND THE PARTNERSHIP TYPE 
Stockholm Vatten is a water supply and sanitation company owned to 100 % by the 
municipality of Stockholm.293 KWC (originally Kauno Vandenys) is a joint-stock company and 
the city of Kaunas is the sole shareholder.294 Thus, the partnership is multinational and 
between two public-authorities. Two municipal operators cooperate in order to improve the 
situation of one partner. The two water providers lie in the global North. SWC had set up 
guidelines and a policy for international cooperation and was thus interested in a twinning 
agreement with a Baltic city. There had been contacts between a consultant (K-Konsult) and 
the EBRD which lead to the conduction of a feasibility study. The study suggested working 
with SWC as a twinning partner. One more reason was that the city of Stockholm was 
strongly committed to the positive development of the Baltic Sea region.295  
4.8.3 PARTNERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES 
An important role concerning the partnership agreement was played by the loan 
arrangements. The papers included loan covenants concerning project execution, financial, 
operational management, reporting and loan effectiveness. Further covenant topics deal with 
targets for good management or operational requirements such as special departments or 
minimum balances. Moreover, several studies on water consumption, leakages, effluents, 
sewerage and other point of interests had to be conducted. These studies had to be 
discussed with the lenders.296 Altogether, a multitude of studies, plans, programmes and 
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agreements had been defined as tasks which had to be conducted, ranging from a business 
plan to quarterly reports. The paperwork fully employed the personnel of KWC and SWC.297 
4.8.4 TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
The strict loan covenants and the reporting scheme worked certainly in favour of a 
transparent and accountable PUP. KWC and SWC had both to report to SIDA. Furthermore, 
the project was assessed by external consultants.298 
4.8.5 KNOWLEDGE-TRANSFER 
There has been an agreed general training programme. Working groups were formed on 
topics such as water saving or on the construction of the waste-water treatment plant.299 
Staff of SWC was integrated into KWC. A resident assistant to the general director, a 
resident financial advisor, and experts either resident or visiting to assist in the institutional 
development were working for KWC. SWC wanted to treat the project as part of the ordinary 
structure. An exchange took place at all levels: between the boards, the trade unions, the 
management teams and between the different specialists. SWC had only little experience in 
international cooperation and this put considerable pressure on the organisation. Key 
resources concerning institutional and management development needed to be hired from 
outside.300 
There were trainings for the board of KWC in Kaunas and Stockholm, study tours to Sweden 
took place. The new financial director was trained by SWC. Notably, the computer 
department of KWC was in some areas more advanced than the one of SWC.301 Hence, for 
the aid-giving partner there was a chance to learn. 
A worthwhile outcome was the fact that the exchanges and knowledge-transfer has 
continued, however more sporadically, after closing of the PUP.302 
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4.8.6 INSTITUTIONAL AND ORGANISATIONAL CHANGES 
The newly appointed change manager divided KWC's activities into core and non-core 
functions, introduced cost savings plans and support packages for voluntary leavers, and 
decentralised the decision-making. SWC helped to design concrete tasks for organisational 
change. SIDA speaks of “often painful” organisational changes. For example, staff of KWC 
was reduced by 20% from 1994 to 1998.303 A small reduction compared to e.g. Jakarta 
where a water privatisation took place in 1997 and over a thousand workers have been laid 
off. Furthermore, the working conditions worsened for those who stayed.304 
The Board of KWC was introduced in 1997 on the grounds of corporatisation. NEFCO, 
EBRD and SWC lobbied for this. The board of the company consisted then of members 
representing the ruling political parties, the city administration, the Kaunas region, the local 
energy utility and the university.305 As stated above, this kind of outsourcing is a broad trend 
in the public sector. 
4.8.7 POLITICS, PARTICIPATION AND POWER RELATIONS 
Due to unstable political circumstances, the project was delayed and it came to other 
difficulties because of local political decision-making. The rules were to a great extent 
dedicated from abroad and thus the local politicians felt left out. Another problem was the 
frequent change of the municipal politicians. SIDA argues that the benefits of the foreign loan 
and grant package were not fully understood by the local politicians and the local population. 
A lot of time was spent on persuading the municipality politicians to comply with the 
contractual agreements.306 Additionally, SIDA acknowledges that the public should have 
been better informed before the conclusion of the contract and the twinning proposal should 
have been publicly debated. This represents only the level “consultation” in consideration of 
the ladder of participation. The PUP could have gained large support in the population. For 
instance, the Green movement in Kaunas was a strong supporter of the construction of a 
waste-water treatment plant. It seemed that everybody in the city understood that this plant 
was needed. Only about the location there were struggles.307 
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4.8.8 OBJECTIVES AND INCENTIVES 
As we have seen, the main goals for KWC were training and developing of human resources, 
technical support, improving efficiency and building institutional capacity, environmental 
goals, and financing water services through revised cost-revenue structures. Protecting 
against privatization was an aim by the political parties and the general public. For KWC it 
was crucial that their twinning partner was a water utility. SIDA finds another argument in 
favour of a PUP: “This utility-to-utility relationship increases the credibility and impact of 
foreign advisers.”308 
Two aims of the ones specified in 3.4 were not of interest for this PUP: it was not intended to 
improve public participation. As mentioned, SIDA argues that there should have been more 
effort to inform the public in order to get public support for the project. They add “In this 
context, also the twinning proposal should have been presented to public scrutiny and 
debate.”309 Improving the access to water services was also no issue in this context. A 
reason can be that there were no marginalised communities in Kaunas or that they were 
ignored. 
SWC offered knowledge and time because they received remuneration for their services and 
they did so in order to learn and to gain valuable experience. SWC is proud of its 
international assignments and of its possibility to improve the environment of the Baltic. The 
organisation believes that it can succeed in running an efficient waterworks and that the 
existent knowledge and experience can be transferred to other water utilities. Most of the 
staff seems to share this vision.310  
In 1991 SWC launched the first Stockholm Water Symposium and invited research scientists, 
civil servants, politicians and other decision-makers. In 1997 the Stockholm International 
Water Institute (SIWI) was formed as an interim organisational unit link between SWC and 
the Symposium. 311  This illustrates that SWC shows corporate social responsibility. 
Gustafsson states in a conference publication, “Throughout the years a great number of 
water professionals have got acquaintance with the good competence and performance of 
the Stockholm Water Company, for instance by arranged study tours inside its service area 
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and to its facilities.“312 The report by Steen Bjerggaard also demonstrates that SWC has a 
clear public sector ethos: “It is Stockholm Water Company’s experience that twinning 
programmes are best arranged between public water companies knowing each other and 
understanding the way of operating a water utility. Such collaboration, based on close 
relations and mutual understanding, certainly improves the chances for success and is a very 
strong option compared to privatisation schemes or consultancy contracts procured in 
competition.”313 
It was not possible to detect any altruistic reasons for joining the partnership within the 
documentation. But this does not mean that there has not been such kind of stimulus. 
4.8.9 COSTS, RISKS AND FINANCIERS 
The costs of the human resources of SWC were covered by SIDA. The investment 
programme was funded by the EBRD.314  Furthermore, EU/Phare, the Finnish and the 
Swedish governments and local sources contributed shares.315 The first phase lasted for one 
year and had cost SEK 4,1 million. (approx. USD 640.000). The second phase took three to 
four years and the costs were SEK 12,3 million (approx. USD 1.910.000)316 KWC had to fulfil 
strict financial loan covenants. In 1997 the financial result was, however, negative. SIDA 
supposes that without SWC the company would have been in a far worse condition.317 
Altogether, the PUP is seen as cost-effective because the impact in relation to the costs is 
high. Alternative ways of delivering the same services would have been more expensive.318 
Obviously the financiers influenced the PUP. The loan covenants of the EBRD dictated to a 
great extent the technical, financial and institutional objectives that KWC and the other 
stakeholders had to pursue. In addition it defined the scope and content of the twinning.319 
4.8.10 OUTCOMES 
Twinning was taken as the tool to achieve institutional strengthening. A Water Time case 
study indicates, “Twinning with Stockholm Water already before and during the investment 
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programme was a big help in making Kaunas Water Company into a modern self-sustaining 
water company.”320  SIDA believes that the institutional and management changes are 
sustainable. The EBRD loan covenants have been fulfilled and a new wastewater treatment 
plant was built. The plant fulfils the Helcom and EU standards. Significant energy savings 
could be achieved. Moreover, the billing system as well as the whole organisation has been 
changed drastically.321 
Though, SIDA feels that the twinning input was not fully utilised by KWC because of delays, 
the absorptive capacity of KWC and a lack of adequate support by the SWC home office. 
They state further that a higher number of experts do not lead to a faster development. SIDA 
notes further that there were maybe too many covenants and that these did not form a 
consistent plan. They conclude that the studies, plans and programmes remained 
fragmented and were not connected to the utility's overall performance targets. However, the 
distinct and measurable specification facilitated benchmarking and working towards concrete 
goals. A proposition would be to do less reporting and give the partnership more free space 
to evolve. This would maybe also help to keep the personnel motivated in order to maintain 
the standard and keep the new knowledge inside KWC as SIDA urges for.322 
It was also intended to develop a commercial attitude within the company and moreover the 
idea rose that the consumers should pay and not the municipality or the government.323 This 
idea together with corporatisation leads to a separation of the municipal council, the public 
sphere, and local parliamentary control, transforming the citizen into a customer. As stated 
above, a PUP with a corporatised entity as one partner is not free of the profit-maximization 
aim. This is a problem but this case example can be a way to learn from it. 
This PUP experience is definitely representative and therefore presentable. Hypothesis 1 
and 2 are fulfilled. Kaunas was modernised, not taken over and became a self-sustaining 
water operator. The institutional changes would have been very different in the case of a 
PPP because, dealing with a PUP, the supported operator could gain new knowledge and 
has still the annual income of the water tariffs. Also the supporting side could learn and 
develop new skills. 
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The municipality maintained the overview over the water provision and the PUP was 
transparent and accountable, at least to the funders. A waste-water treatment plant was 
installed and the EU and Helcom environmental standards were met. It seems that in this 
case service levels, coverage levels and environmental regulation are positively influenced 
by the PUP. It is altogether a low cost solution because a new plant was constructed plus the 
workers and the management of Kaunas received trainings and know-how. Thus the impact 
compared to the costs is high. Kaunas really could gain the capacity to run a modern utility 
after the end of the PUP. Bjerggaard explains effusively, “The water companies in Kaunas 
and Riga stand today as successful role models for twinning arrangements between public 
water entities, where goals were met timely and within budget.”324  
4.9 SUMMARY 
In a PUP the aim is to achieve a transfer of knowledge in order to build up skills in 
operational, technical and financial management of the badly performing utility. This helps to 
speed up the expansion and improvement of public water supply. PUPs can cover the full 
range of water and sanitation services and lead to technical improvements and/or know-how 
transfer. Different water actors of the public sphere work together on a non-profit basis in 
order to improve the water services of one of them. Operators in need often do not have the 
financial resources to hire consultancy services.325 Hence, PUPs are one very relevant way 
to provide safe water and adequate sanitation. Cooperating with genuine public partners the 
disadvantages of PPPs like the extraction of profits or the exclusion of already marginalised 
groups are avoided. 
Chapter one showed that most water projects focus mostly on infrastructure development 
and only rarely on capacity building. The concept of a PUP is contrary to that as it is 
focussing on this particular key issue. Capacities are built following the use of counselling, 
training, management, financial restructuring, joint investment, etc. The most common type 
of a PUP is arranged between two municipalities (e.g. cities) which either located within the 
same or within different countries. The case example shows that modernisation can bring 
very good results and that there is no need to privatise a water operator in a poor condition. 
This is just a short summary because the success factors, the benefits and challenges of 
PUPs are summarized and discussed in chapter five. In this chapter, a closer look is given to 
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a comparison between PUPs and PPPs. The next chapter deals with Water Operator 
Partnerships which is an initiative by the UN. It is similar to PUPs but has a great conceptual 
problem. 
  
 81 
5. WATER OPERATOR PARTNERSHIPS 
Not only practitioners and several scientists are fond of PUPs, also the UN pushes for 
partnerships between water operators. The UN Secretary General's Board on Water and 
Sanitation (UNSGAB) has even launched an initiative called Water Operator Partnerships 
(WOPs). In this chapter I give a brief overview over the origins of this initiative and the work 
of the Global Water Operators' Partnership Alliance (GWOPA). I clarify the objectives and 
incentives regarding such a partnership and compare WOPs to PUPs. 
5.1 HISTORY OF ORIGINS 
The UN advocates water partnerships. In 2006 the UNSGAB has launched the mentioned 
initiative Water Operator Partnerships (WOPs). The idea behind this was that the greatest 
potential to improve the public water utilities rests upon at the public suppliers themselves 
since most water utilities are organized locally or community-wide. It was seen as a way to 
reach the MDGs. The WOP model was included in the Hashimoto Action Plan326 in 2006. 
The water operator partnerships were meant to provide support for capacity building of public 
water operators. 
WOPs are clearly modelled after PUPs but in the UNSGAB literature there is no reference to 
the original partnership model. Only in one meeting protocol, documented on the UNSGAB 
website, one can find the quote „Water Operator Partnerships (WOPs), previously called 
Public-Public-Partnerships (PUPs)“.327 Originally, the concept of WOPs has been the same 
as that of PUPs but meanwhile it was expanded and includes by now also private water 
suppliers.328 The UNSGAB states that most WOPs will be between public operators. But 
„private sector operators, NGOs or those who can contribute to the performance of public 
water undertakings on a not-for-profit basis” are not excluded.329 There were members of the 
UNSGAB for and against the idea of taking private companies into the concept. It seems that 
the proponents have prevailed.330 Boag and McDonald found an answer for the inclusion of 
the private sector, „The most obvious answer is that the UNSGAB was dominated by 
individuals who are either in the private sector or have supported private-sector participation 
in the water sector in the past, including Michel Camdessus (former Director of the IMF), 
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Margaret Catley-Carlson (advisor for the multinational water company Suez Lyonnaise des 
Eaux), Angel Gurria (former member of the Camdessus Panel on Financing Water 
Infrastructure) and Gerard Payen (former VP at Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux ).“331 The other 
members of the board who were proponents of the public sector have probably authorised 
the inclusion in order to promote the creation of a database storing information on utility 
partners.332 
To subsume, a WOP is defined as “any form of simple or structured partnership between two 
(or more) water operators that provides professional support for capacity building based on 
mutual trust, is based on not-for-profit principles (though costs should be recovered, partly or 
in full), is results-oriented according to agreed terms, and is based on good governance 
principles (integrity, transparency and accountability).”333 The WOP concept focuses on 
capacity-building without cashing profits. The partnership works under transparent and 
accountable conditions. Results and cost-recovery are important targets. 
5.2 GWOPA 
The Global Water Operators' Partnership Alliance (GWOPA) is a network of international 
agencies, regional development banks and funding agencies, utilities and their associations 
and other stakeholders from the water supply and sanitation sector worldwide. In 2009, it 
held its foundation meeting in Nairobi, Kenya. “GWOPA’s mandate is to build on ongoing 
efforts and provide financial, technical, and advocacy support for WOPs at the global 
level.”334 
GWOPA works in six activity areas: First, they support regional WOPs with funding and 
organisational help. Second, they are concerned with knowledge-management to assist 
WOPs. Third, they have developed a benchmarking system (GRUBS) for data on utilities.335 
Fourth, they are investing into capacity building and training of the workers of water 
operators. Fifth, they give financial guidance and raise funds. Sixth, they take care of 
communication activities and try to build alliances.336 
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In partnership with GWOPA a Code of Conduct has to be signed and is observed by all 
parties involved in WOPs activities. Its principles include the topics of good governance, 
integrity, social and cultural values, resolution of conflicts, result-orientation, cost-sharing and 
not-for-profit as well as shared incentives. The partners have to agree on not withholding any 
information to other parties in order to realise commercial gains, and that no confidential 
information of one party is used by another for its commercial benefit. Furthermore, it is 
stated that neither one should use WOPs as “a vehicle for commercial activities.”337 
GWOPA divides the existing WOP initiatives into the following regional groups: Asia, Africa, 
the Arab region, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, North America, and Oceania. I 
give a brief overview over the activities taking place in these regional groups. 
5.2.1 ASIA 
USAid, ADB and IWA established an Asia-wide regional partnership network called 
Waterlinks. On their website are 27 WOPs listed. Waterlinks considers two partnerships to 
very successful. The first one was arranged between the Da Nang Water Supply Company 
(DAWACO) and the Manila Water Company of the Philippines which is a PPP. The second 
mentioned partnership was established between Metro Cebu Water District (MCWD) in the 
Philippines and City West Water (CWW), a water utility owned by the government of the 
Australian state Victoria.338 Research by TNI and PSIRU revealed that four out of eight 
partnerships in the regional WOP initiative organized by the Asian Development Bank involve 
private companies as expert partners. USAid financed twinning arrangements in Asia too. 
Within this connection commercial contracts are explicitly allowed after an ending of a WOP. 
In these cases seven out of ten partnerships involve private partners, even when public 
operators serve 90% of the people in this region.339 
5.2.2 AFRICA 
The Africa Water Association manages the WOP-Africa programme. IWA and GWOPA state 
that a first WOP between NWSC in Uganda and Kisumu Water and Sanitation Company 
(KIWASCO) in Kenya was established. KIWASCO is a private company.340 
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5.2.3 THE ARAB REGION 
The Arab Countries Water Utilities Association (ACWUA) was established with the support of 
GTZ (meanwhile called Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH, 
short GIZ) and United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (UN-
ESCWA). The aims of this association are first, bringing together water experts and utilities in 
the Arab region and second, representing and promoting technical, managerial, legal, 
scientific and economic interests of water utilities in the Arab region.341 
5.2.4 EUROPE 
A South-East European WOP platform (WOP-SEE) is planned.342 There are no WOPs 
indicated in the WOP papers or on the GWOPA website. 
5.2.5 LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 
Four WOPs are listed in the publication of IWA and GWOPA343: 
• EPM (Colombia) & ENACAL (Nicaragua) on information systems 
• SABESP (Brazil) & SEDAPAL (Peru) on e-procurement 
• AGUAS ANDINAS (Chile) & SEDAPAR (Peru)on  management efficiency 
• DIGAP (Chile), EMAC (Ecuador) & COSMOL (Bolivia) on solid waste 
The first WOP seems to be one between public partners. The second partnership is different 
though. SABESP is also majority-owned by the State of Sao Paulo and thus not public in the 
sense of this paper.344 The third partnership is again no PUP because Aguas Andinas is a 
private company.345 The fourth WOP is a multi-partnership between DIGAP, a public body, 
EMAC, a corporatised water unit and COSMOL, a cooperative.346 
5.2.6 NORTH AMERICA 
There are no WOPs indicated in the papers of IWA and GWOPA or on the GWOPA-website. 
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5.2.7 OCEANIA 
There are two WOPs that have taken place in Oceania and both of them count as WOPs in 
Asia. The first on is Hai Phong Water Supply Company (Vietnam) & Yarra Valley Water 
(Australia) on asset management in 2010. This WOP seems to be a public one.347 The 
second and already mentioned above one is Metro Cebu Water District (Philippines) & City 
West Water District (Australia) on non-revenue water in 2009. 
So we see that there exists only a small number of WOPs and furthermore only a small 
number of pure public partnerships among them. 
5.3 OBJECTIVES AND INCENTIVES 
Why would private companies work on a not-for-profit basis? Do they really give expertise for 
free? For them knowledge is something valuable and not a free-floating good because a 
private company maybe loses a commercial advantage compared to rivals. Why should it 
provide valuable information and loose, by doing so, prospects? 
Dealing with a private partner in a WOP some objectives, mentioned in chapter 3.4, change 
compared to PUPs. On the supporting side the motivation is nearly the same except that 
protecting against privatization and the promotion of the public sector ethos drop out. Also 
the financial incentives differ because in those cases follow-up orders are probably expected 
or the work is very well-paid and this motivates to join such a partnership. On the supported 
side we see the same picture. Here, an additional reason can be the goal to receive inputs 
from the private and not the public sector. 
Firms have an incentive to prevent PUPs because these partnerships take away chances to 
do business and gain profits. When a public operator is not privatised or does not 
commission a company to do a certain service for them but contrary receives help to do the 
job on its own, then a market opportunity is lost. It can be expected that private water 
suppliers will lobby against PUPs  
5.4 PROBLEMS 
It makes no sense to include the private sector into the WOP concept. This contradicts the 
idea of promoting the public sector. Lobina and Hall sum this up, “[...] the effectiveness of 
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PUPs is to be promoted by fostering their public-ness and enhancing their distinctive 
characteristics rather than relying on mechanisms, such as the competitive selection of 
partners and mimicking of commercial contracts, which risk to prejudice the dynamics on 
which the success of PUPs rests.” 348  The private sector is already favoured through 
mechanisms at global or regional level. Mechanisms that favour the interests of public 
operators are rare.349 The private sector provides many possibilities for doing business. But 
as we see in the examples above, there are barely any pure public partnerships. Miranda 
argues that the inclusion of private companies into the WOP initiative will cause confusion 
and problems.350 It is risky to use the initiative as a pure marketing strategy or that the 
private sector actually confronts the idea that the potential to improve the public water utilities 
lies at the public suppliers themselves. They claim that PUPs block their market 
opportunities.351 Another problem is the compliance with the code of conduct. There are 
apparently no consequences when it is not observed. 
Hall et al. propose to install a quarantine preventing commercial business between WOP 
partners for a certain period of time after the WOP itself. This should prevent that a WOP is 
just used to gather information on an operator. It is also possible that public operators or 
NGOs try to use such a partnership to accumulate capital from outside their boundaries. 
Such quarantine would help to keep the partnership non-profit. GWOPA actually wanted to 
include a quarantine rule but the private companies inside this programme were against it.352 
IWA and GWOPA themselves state that partnerships at best can be developed between 
water operators. They describe a WOP case where one partner (Stockholm Water) was 
considered to be a consultant and not as an equal partners. This led to a lack of openness 
and trust which is needed for sustainable results.353 A real partnership is about sharing 
ideas, not consulting anybody. 
The inclusion of private companies could also lead to a competitive selection of WOP 
partners, similar to commercial contracts.354 It may happen that public operators have to 
present them to be in a somewhat good shape in order to receive help. Furthermore, WOP 
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arrangement seem to favour corporatisation 355 , which chapter two has shown to be 
customer- and not citizens-oriented as well as oriented towards short-term and monetary 
goals. 
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6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Chapter one has shown that more and more water is used, above all for agriculture. A great 
problem is the fact that a lot of regions suffer or will suffer from water shortage. Moreover, 
conflicts of water use can occur because cities and industries require of this resource very 
much. Later on was a strong concentration of multinational private water-suppliers but a lot of 
them sold their shares and went out of the water provision market. In developing countries 
we can rather find small-scale private suppliers if the provision is not done by the state or 
municipalities. When there are water management problems, they comprise usually a lack of 
political support, poor governance, under-resourcing and under-investment. This leads to a 
non-transparent, non-accountable, economically unsustainable water provision going along 
with water losses and low revenue collection. The UN pushes for the achievement of the 
Millennium Development Goals and proposes to invest not solely in infrastructure but to 
increase the efficiency of the infrastructure already built. 
Chapter two illustrated that in theory, privatisation brings enormous benefits if cases of 
market failure are disregarded. It was shown that the water industry does not fit into standard 
economic theory. In practice the private ownership or private involvement in the water sector 
can be highly problematic. Governments and municipalities have favoured privatization, 
trustfully seeking to receive an efficient service. Governments in developing countries often 
had no other chance as to sell off or lease public assets in order to receive desperately 
needed development funding. What is often overlooked: budgetary constraints on 
government borrowing are political decisions and not immovable conditions. Furthermore, 
governments constantly raise taxes, even in difficult economic periods.356 So the argument 
that governments are unable to raise funds is not true. Even more, private companies pay 
more for credits as they are more prone to bankruptcy. It often seems that PPPs or 
corporatisation are used to simply move debts off the public balance sheet.357 
International organisations and IFIs have been and still are very in favour of private solutions 
that should help to reach the MDGs. Yet, they have realized that the financial resources will 
not come from the private sector as companies are interested in profitable but low-risk 
markets. In many cases, companies have even allowed social, political, economic or 
environmental damage resulting from their own activities even though they were fully aware 
of the impacts. Leakages for example are not seen as an urgent matter by companies. It is, 
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however, clear that not every corporate involvement produces negative outcomes. More, it 
depends on the individual case.358 Hall and Lobina summarize, “Expectations of private 
companies should be based on economic realism: the range of actions available to 
corporations is limited by the rate of return acceptable to shareholders.“359 
The involvement of the private sector can evolve in different forms ranging from a mere 
service contract to a full privatisation. The latter is not popular anymore and the general trend 
leads to having public operators run as a business. PPPs are widely adopted, but the costs 
and risks are relatively high. High transaction costs occur as well as the costs for an effective 
regulation. Bribery and corruption has often been the case in the area of water services as 
well as hidden costs in form of subsidies and guarantees. The costs for citizens are also 
susceptible to rise. The investment into the water sector is due to decline because profits are 
extracted and not reinvested. Furthermore, the risks of a PPP are high because not all 
possible circumstances can be covered in a contract, moreover when the contract’s time 
frame is up to 30 years. The final risk, that a PPP fails, has to be bared by the state because 
the water services are vital to society, above all, because the demand for water is price-
inelastic. Hall thinks, “In all cases, the expenditure of public money needs to be justified by 
expected improvements in the general economic and/or social well-being of the country or 
region. In terms of public policy, no PPP can ever be justified only by reference to the profits 
made by the private company.”360 
In summary, it is proven that privatisation increases the microeconomic performance which 
includes the profitability of companies and the productivity. In contrast, the impacts on 
efficiency and of the performance increase on the broader economy and on poverty are 
ambiguous.361 Above all, privatisation has negative effects on poor groups of the population. 
These groups are not an attractive clientèle of private companies. Furthermore, setting up an 
effective regulation is a problem, not only for developing countries. Plus, privatisation 
distances the government from providing a basic need. 
All in all, private sector involvement did not lead to the desired results or outcomes and we 
find numerous examples of failures and difficulties, especially in the South. Prasad says, 
“Those who were putting pressure on governments to privatise now recognise that 
infrastructure privatisation failed to bring the expected gains and growth to the economy. [...] 
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Very few privatisations were successful, while the majority did not achieve what was 
intended. ”362 The Netherlands and Uganda have even made water privatisation illegal. In 
2004 both countries have passed laws that stipulate the water entities need to be public or 
publicly-owned.363 Developing countries undergo a dramatic increase in water prices, low 
and socially asymmetrical expansion of the water supply, secret contracts, and a burden on 
public finances as a result of profit guarantees. Their very similar experiences are due to the 
development aid conditionalities of international financial institutions and because of allowing 
privatization to local elites.364 The argumentation, that privatisation of water would bring an 
enlarged and low-priced provision, is not correct. The World Bank recognised that in certain 
local contexts privatisation makes no sense. In general, World Bank staff has very different 
views and opinions on privatisation but as an institution the bank is still adhering rigidly on 
market approaches.365 The bank is highly promoting PPPs and the private management of 
public utilities. It recommends governments to involve the private sector in water services.366 
So, the debate on private sector involvement is still vivid and seemingly not coming to a 
halt.367 Contrarily, it has turned to PPPs and community or locally based solutions. 
Chapter four presented the idea of the UN about Water Operator Partnerships. The problem 
of the concept is that private companies are explicitly included and this brings several risks. 
WOPs could be used as marketing tools only or private companies could just use them to 
explore new markets. Altogether it is reasonable that the UN puts money into partnerships 
between water operators and furthermore adds value to them. Water operators can receive 
help and funding allowing investment into capacity building and training of the workers. 
Maybe this leads to more support for PUPs within the UN and moreover among the group of 
IFIs. To give operators a platform networking surely assists public operators as the absence 
of a platform or forum for public operators is hindering a larger occurrence of PUPs. Despite, 
it is still difficult to find a suitable partner.368 The WOP Database is a useful tool to overcome 
this problem. Up to now, one cannot find a lot of information on GWOPA’s website. Thus, is 
not yet foreseeable what the outcome of the benchmarking system (GRUBS) will be because 
there is not a lot of comparable data. The proposed quarantine rule should be introduced. 
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In this last chapter, I will discuss the findings on PUPs and draw a conclusion. I will for this 
reason summarize the benefits of PUPs and mention the factors which lead to their success. 
I will also reflect on the difficulties and challenges of this approach. 
6.1 THE BENEFITS OF PUBLIC-PUBLIC PARTNERSHIPS 
Altogether, PUPs primarily provide know-how transfer at low cost, thus outmatching 
comparable sources for the enhancement of efficiency, effectiveness and productivity. Note, 
however, that a lot of the benefits of PUPs are context-specific and cannot be generalised. 
OFFERING EFFECTIVE KNOW-HOW TRANSFER: 
The focus of PUPs lies on knowledge-transfer and capacity building instead of gaining profit. 
They offer a long-term increase in capacity building and an effective way of know-how 
transfer. As know-how is not private amongst public partners, they can share it easily. In a 
PPP a general loss of training is possible because of an increased use of outsourcing which 
reduces the incentives and the capacity for training employers.369 In a PPP, know-how 
transfer is not even  happening casually. Since the private partner takes over the water 
provision, it is not foreseen to improve the knowledge-base of the public part. The orientation 
of the workers changes towards short-term goals. Only the commercial objective is important 
any more. 
In a PUP a multiplier effect is possible because the pool of public-sector entities, capable of 
providing support to others increases with each PUP. Boag and McDonald call this a vicious 
circle of capacity building.370 One example is Beheira in Egypt which was first supported by 
Amsterdam Waternet and afterwards supporting partner of DZH and Gedaref in Sudan.371 
IMPROVING OPERATOR CAPACITY AT LOW COST 
PUPs are able to improve water infrastructure and service delivery capacity at lower cost 
than Public-Private partnerships or a privatised operator. As we have seen in chapter two, 
the costs of PPPs for a national economy or, more locally, for the municipality are first of all 
high transaction costs as well as the costs for an effective regulation. In addition, there are 
most of the time hidden costs such as subsidies and guarantees. In the case of private 
provision, the tariffs are susceptible to rise.  
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The chapter on PUPs showed that the costs of them comprise expenses for the search of a 
partner, for human resources, for travelling, and, if it is the case, for new or enhanced 
infrastructure. Risks that could arise concerning a new infrastructure can be avoided by 
conducting feasibility studies. It is very unlikely for the supporting partner to give 
misinformation or to harm the partnership which arise costs.. Therefore, PUPs cost less than 
PPPs. The assigning of expensive external consultants from in- or outside the country is 
generally not necessary. Experts can be acquired from the supporting partner. The skills of 
municipal workers are improved and the dependence on consulting companies is reduced.372 
Besides, the investment into the water sector is due to decline in the case of privatisation or 
of a PPP because profits are extracted and not reinvested. When an operator stays public it 
is more likely that investments are made. The extension of the water network is mainly done 
by public forces.373 Hall and Lobina explain this further, “Underinvestment by private water 
companies is also a feature of their behaviour in a high-income country like the UK, which 
suggests it is a systematic feature of the private sector’s behaviour.” 374  Another 
characteristic disfavouring a private provision is the fact that the risks of a PPP are high 
because not all possible circumstances can be covered in a contract. Plus, it can cost a large 
sum of money to dissolve such an agreement. PUPs constitute flexible partnerships which 
bring lower risks for the municipality, community and the state. These fluid partnerships are 
less costly and cumbersome as takeover processes used by the private sector.375 
PROMOTING DEMOCRATIC AND MORE EQUITABLE WATER SERVICES 
PUPs are a way of democratising water services by providing greater participation in 
decision-making and delivery for water users, front-line workers, and different levels of 
government. Likewise the unions and workers request a more democratic system. They call 
for a more rational and modern administration. They demand a timely personnel 
management, closeness to citizens, customer orientation and more involvement of the users 
of the public system. It is not the wish of more state but of a better state.376 FENTAP, the 
Peruvian water sector workers' federation points out that “PUPs are a technical tool and at 
the same time a political tool for those working towards effective public water delivery and 
the universalization of water services.”377 
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Another feature of such cooperation is the possibility to increase service equity by expanding 
the network of connections to areas out of service and by ensuring that a basic amount of 
water is available for all. Equity can mean to distribute water according to demand by treating 
disparity unequally or by ensuring a minimum-package of benefits so that nobody falls under 
a certain level. Different countries can have different equity goals. Howsoever, private 
players do not have the aim to scale down system expenses in order to pass the savings on 
to weaker social sections. It is also contrary to the aim of private suppliers to ensure 
equitable supply to marginalized groups and people who are not able to pay for water. PUPs 
are able to reduce costs of supplying water while ensuring equitable supply to all citizens.378 
But equity is not always a stated aim of a PUP and community participation is not a panacea 
for better service quality. However, with a PUP the decisions can take the time needed 
because of the larger time horizon and the larger political objectives.379 Besides, there is low 
or even no resistance by the public against a PUP. 
BUILDING SOLIDARITY AMONGST MUNICIPAL OPERATORS 
With PUPs it is possible to build solidarity amongst public-sector managers, workers and the 
communities on a local, regional and global scale. PUPs enable actors to increase and share 
their knowledge as well as to provide or raise confidence and pride in serving their 
citizens.380 There is a mutual understanding because two public partners cooperate and thus 
these partnerships are more efficient and cooperative. Not struggling with distrust, all 
partners can concentrate on the actual work. 
In a PPP you experience a conflict of objectives between the public service mission and the 
focus on the shareholder value. Lobina and Hall point out, “The [water] services are too vital 
both socially and economically to rely on corporate self-regulation, and countries lack 
effective capacity to regulate such corporations.”381 
BRINGING THE PUBLIC-SECTOR INTO FOCUS 
PUPs are proofing for the fact that the private sector is not inherently better at service 
provision than the public sector. PUPs provide concrete evidence of the ability of the public 
sector to outperform the private sector. The public sector is able to show tangible results 
rather than just using rhetoric.382 Boag and McDonald state, “PUPs are seen to help re-focus 
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policy-making attention on the public sector in general, and on ways to improve public-sector 
water services in particular. In doing so, PUPs take us beyond the false assertion that public-
private partnerships are the only mechanism to resolve the stasis of private versus public 
water services. ”383 As already mentioned above, the public sector serves 90% of the world 
population with water and sanitation services. The focus on PUPs, and thus on the public 
sector, promotes the developing countries in improving and expanding their water services. 
In the case of a PPP or a privatisation, the municipalities lose their ability to control and 
maintain the water services. With a PUP the local control is supported. 
SOLVE THE PROBLEMS OF WATER MANAGEMENT 
The problems of water management, summed up before, can be solved with PUPs. Lack of 
political support can be overcome because politicians are explicitly involved. Transparency 
and accountability can clearly become a essential part of these partnerships. Usually, the 
aim of a PUP is not only to construct new infrastructure but to accumulate new knowledge for 
an operator. This is a sustainable way to improve water operators. Under-resourcing can be 
tackled with an improved management and financial help. Under-investment is better 
mastered by the public sector because private companies do not seem to put money into 
water programmes. 
6.2 SUCCESS FACTORS 
PUPs can outmatch PPPs or privatizations under specific circumstances. These reasons for 
this are more or less the success factors of a PUP. 
There are several success factors which can be found in the literature and the case example. 
Obviously it needs conscious agency to make the partnership work. Success depends to a 
great part on the qualification of the people. The management and the advisers need to be 
trained in the areas of organisational development. The workers need to be well informed 
and sufficient staff is required. The administrative support has to be, of course, professional. 
This has been a problem in Kaunas. Experience with international or inter-organisational 
teamwork is also clearly a big advantage. Lobina and Hall believe, however, that the 
suitability to carry out the tasks identified under partnership design are probably more 
important than prior experience with working in such a context. 384  Thus, finding an 
appropriate partner leads to success. The absence of a platform or forum for public operators 
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is hindering a massive occurrence of PUPs. The WOP Database can be a useful tool to 
overcome this gap. 
A fully financed PUP can become a triumph. However, it is a great challenge to find 
financiers since the majority of donor funding is directed to PPPs. Financiers highly influence 
PUPs and thus the success is depending on them. Another challenge is to convince 
governments, funders, and end users of the positive attributes and qualities of PUPs in the 
water sector.385 This paper is written with the intention to do so. One consideration of how to 
promote these partnerships to financiers is that it is probably easier to propose a partnership 
between two (or more) public-authorities to international financing institutes and to other 
donors because it is clear from the beginning what will be the outcome of this activity. It is a 
top-down process where the management keeps all its power and decision-making ability. 
This is useful when the civil society is not well-developed or when the water-problems are not 
too severe. When other partners such as civil society groups are involved, it is probably 
harder to find funds because of the unclear outcome. Furthermore, community involvement 
and participation by citizens usually do not start by a top-down command. Most of the time it 
is a bottom-up development when the civil society gets active and starts to work towards a 
change. 
Public operators experience problems because of flaws in the institutional framework such as 
a lack of accountability of managers, staff or politicians. 386  Thus, not only in private 
constellations but also in PUPs well-functioning accountability structures are needed. All the 
funds should be taken for the foreseen actions. 
Concerning the know-how transfer, a receptive operator can enhance the outcome of the 
PUP. If a learning culture inside an operator already exists, then a sustainable long-lasting 
know-how-transfer is possible. 
6.3 DIFFICULTIES AND CHALLENGES 
There are several challenges to be mastered and difficulties to overcome in order to have a 
sound foundation of PUPs so that practitioners can easily form a PUP by themselves. 
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NORMATIVE VALUES 
Boag and McDonald criticize the confusing mix of normative values, empirical findings, and 
abstract concepts mentioned in literature. The objectives of PUPs are often just normative 
values like equity, democracy, participation, sustainability, transparency, solidarity and 
universality. What are missing are discussions on how to put these values into practice, how 
to measure or investigate them and what are the implications when there are competing 
norms. For practitioners it can be difficult to understand how to organise, implement and 
evaluate a successful PUP.387 I tried to be clear about these objectives and to avoid 
normative values. Important to know is for example if we reach equity at the expense of other 
goals such as sustainability or efficiency. All norms need to be clear to address them 
practically. It is also not evident that all norms are universal to all countries388 but detailed 
analysis of this point would lead to far and is therefore omitted. 
PARTNERSHIP 
Apparently, logistical and political difficulties can occur in such a multifaceted partnership like 
a PUP. In international co-operations the workforce can encounter cultural and language 
difficulties, uneven technological skills, different hydrological contexts, varying labour-
management relations, differing histories of water commodification or dissimilar 
interpretations of equity. 
MARKET LOGIC 
For some, the idea of corporatisation is a positive development. For others this idea 
undermines the discussed objectives of PUPs like equity and universality. The third group is 
worried about the further marginalisation of already weak social groups. Because who shouts 
the loudest is likely to receive more attention. Not to forget that today’s wants and needs are 
often being created by the market, e.g. bottled water, water-intensive appliances or water-
intensive leisure activities.389 
A problem is that even public initiatives can have the aim to maximize profits. Not only 
private companies are trying to reach this target. For example, Uganda's National Water and 
Sewerage Company had run several South-South partnerships in sub-Sahara Africa. 
Observers say that the objective of NWSC has also been the attraction of more private-
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sector participation.390 Market-orientation and profit-making are problematic in the field of 
water provision. 
WATER-USE EFFICIENCY  
When we look at the case of water privatisation in London we see that the private company 
had not the goal to save water. The pipelines have not been renewed and it came to very 
high leakage rates. There were weekly pipe bursts because the company increased the 
water pressure in order to provide the customers with enough water. This is definitely a not-
sustainable use of water. The company had no incentive to save any water. 391  
Water-use efficiency should also be improved to support both, the society and the 
environment. Private companies have no interest to save water when there are no 
regulations392. But it seems that public utilities do not behave better than private companies 
in the case of water saving.393 Thus it needs stimuli or regulatory measures to improve the 
water-use efficiency. 
LEGISLATIONS 
Local legislations in the support-giving country can be an impediment to the spending of local 
water revenues, and thus parts of the municipal budget, to a water operator somewhere else. 
Politicians have to be convinced or the money comes from other sources.394 
UNEVEN DISTRIBUTION 
The water supply systems vary strongly around the world and this constrains the transfer of 
technology and of governance models. The water systems work poorly in most sub-Saharan 
Africa and parts of Asia because the parts of the society served by networks are only small, 
and in a way an economic, cultural, and social elite.395 
6.4 CONCLUSION 
The context in which water and water services are embedded is multifaceted. It is necessary 
that water and water services are seen in a political, social, cultural, technological, 
environmental and legislative context. Opschoor puts it this way, “Power asymmetries, 
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preferences (social and private) and interests, as well as ideologically or opportunistically 
based preferences for institutional forms of decision making and management of water 
systems, all are behind current systems of water provision and water management; they also 
feature in debates about water sector reform.”396 Different interests are behind each step 
taken in the direction towards more public or more private involvement. Underdevelopment is 
not only a problem of economic scarcity but also a political issue. It is in general required to 
determine how the provision of public goods is decided and funded. Who benefits and who 
pays?397 Also debates on water supply and sanitation are clearly focusing on the question 
“who is to pay for these services?” and not on where the water should come from or how to 
help the poor to get safe water. “The struggle for clean water and environmental 
preservation, therefore, is a political process whereby “who pays what” is defined and, in 
which public pressure plays a major role.”398  
Using regulation it was attempted to turn a private company into a charitable being. This 
effort could have been better spent on modernising public operators. PPPs have failed too 
often and after all, water is such an important resource. It is a fundamental critique which is 
put forward in this paper: PPPs are not the best solution to receive an efficient water 
provision. They failed to deliver the expected benefits in urban water supply and sanitation. 
This is even argued by the IMF together with the World Bank within a publication. Both state 
that a PSP is not necessarily superior in providing water services than the public sector.399 
As has been seen in this thesis, PUPs are completely different to PPPs. They avoid risks like 
high transaction costs, contract infringement, renegotiation, inadequate regulation, 
opportunism, monopoly prices, the obligation of secrecy, currency risk and the lack of 
popular legitimacy.”400 Besides costs and risk, the impact of a PPP regarding the mission 
and objectives of the public service, their economic effects e.g. on employment or the fiscal 
impact on public authorities, and their relative willingness to pay of citizens have to be 
considered. A pure commercial comparison is insufficient.401  
The above summarised benefits of PUPs demonstrate that they can definitely outmatch 
PPPs or privatizations. Miranda argues, “PUPs are not the only way, but surely they are one 
of the most relevant ways to provide, universally and within the shortest timeframe, safe 
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water and adequate sanitation – a human right that has been inexcusably neglected so 
far.”402 PUPs enhance the public good in a sustainable way.403 A key point of this kind of 
partnership is that it works on a non-for profit basis and the earnings are reinvested inside 
the local water system. Their openness helps to create trust and allows the involved partners 
to learn effectively. 
Private provision and PPPs are still seen as THE solution to global water problems. The 
results of the World Water Forum404 in Istanbul 2009 on the topic of financing and managing 
water clearly promote private solutions and pushes for private investors. An exemplary 
slogan in the report of the Forum says ”There is money to be made in the water sector!” 
405They also state that, “The topic of “water as an economic good” was carefully avoided 
during the Forum due to its controversial nature. [...] However, the concept of “water as an 
economic good” was intrinsic to all discussions regarding pricing and public-private 
partnerships. ”406 We will see if there will ever be a shift towards promoting the public sector. 
The maxim worth following should at any rate be modernising not privatising. No privatization 
is required to achieve the goals of ecological, social and economic improvements. In the 
water sector know-how transfer should thus become more important instead of constructing 
and building new infrastructure when there are simple and cheap solutions faster to 
implement. It is for example projected that the MDG on sewage will not be met. A possible 
solution might be to have more PUPs rather than focusing on sewage services as shown 
within the case example. If we want a global well-running water provision, PUPs need to 
become more relevant and for this they need a better financial back-up.  
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ANNEXE 
ABSTRACT 
A growing number of public water operators have started to help other public water suppliers 
to improve their services in order to become more efficient and better trained. Such a support 
agreement is called Public-Public Partnership (PUP). Such a cooperation is often created 
because of twin town arrangements between cities or municipalities. The water utilities or 
water companies work together on a non-profit basis to build up skills through the use of 
counselling, training, management, financial restructuring, joint investment and other 
measures.  
These PUPs are a viable alternative to private sector involvement and primarily provide 
know-how transfer at low cost, thus outmatching comparable sources for the enhancement of 
efficiency, effectiveness and productivity. They can outperform PPPs or privatizations in the 
water sector under certain circumstances. This paper discusses the concept of PUPs, the 
different partnership types and partnership arrangements. Furthermore, the characteristics of 
PUPs and the associated ideas which are given in the literature are provided and their 
accuracy for the cases of a Swedish and a Lithuanian operator are analysed. Furthermore, 
the differences between PUPs and Water Operator Partnerships (WOPs) – an initiative by 
the UN Secretary General's Board on Water and Sanitation - are discussed. 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Eine wachsende Zahl von öffentlichen Wasserversorgungsunternehmen hat damit 
begonnen, anderen öffentlichen Wasserversorgern zu helfen, ihre Leistungen zu verbessern, 
um effizienter zu werden und besser qualifiziert zu sein. Solch eine 
Unterstützungsvereinbarung wird Public-Public Partnership (PUP) bezeichnet und entsteht 
oft aufgrund von Partnerschaften zwischen Städten oder Gemeinden. Die 
Wasserversorgungsunternehmen arbeiten gemeinsam auf non-profit Basis und bauen durch 
den Einsatz von Beratung, Ausbildung, Änderungen im Management, finanzielle 
Umstrukturierung, gemeinsame Investitionen und andere Maßnahmen die benötigten 
Fähigkeiten auf. 
Diese PUPs stellen eine Alternative zur Beteiligung des privaten Sektors dar und bieten vor 
allem die Möglichkeit des Know-How Transfers zu geringen Kosten und übertreffen damit 
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andere Möglichkeiten der Steigerung der Effizienz, Effektivität und Produktivität. Im 
Wassersektor übertreffen sie PPPs oder Privatisierungen im Allgemeinen unter bestimmten 
Umständen. Diese Arbeit beschreibt das Konzept der PUPs, die verschiedenen 
Partnerschaftsarten und -abkommen. Darüber hinaus werden die Eigenschaften von PUPs 
und die damit verbundenen Ideen, die in der Literatur angegeben ist, dargestellt und deren 
Anwendbarkeit für die Kooperation eines schwedischen und eines litauischen Betreibers 
analysiert. Außerdem werden die Unterschiede zwischen PUPs und Water Operator 
Partnerships (WOPS) - eine Initiative des UN Secretary General's Board on Water and 
Sanitation - diskutiert. 
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